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ISRAELI DEMOLITION OF
PALESTINIAN HOUSES
AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE:
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW TO REGULATION 119
Brian Farrell∗
I. INTRODUCTION

S

ince the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza, Israel has employed the practice of demolishing civilian houses as a response to offenses committed in these territories. The use of demolitions as a punitive measure has generated considerable opposition in the international community
and among legal experts. These scholars argue that the demolition of houses is impermissible under existing international
law.
This article examines the practice of punitive housing demolition by Israeli forces in the West Bank and Gaza and draws
conclusions as to its legality under international law. Part II
reviews the legal structure in the territories and explains the
role of the Israeli courts. Next, Part III discusses the policy behind housing demolition, the justifications given for this measure, and the implementation of this practice. Parts IV and V
analyze the provisions of international law relating to housing
demolition. Part IV discusses human rights law, while Part V
examines humanitarian law as contained in the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention. Both parts review
the Israeli application of international law in the West Bank
and Gaza before engaging in an independent analysis on their
applicability. Finally, the legality of housing demolition will be
reviewed in light of the specific provisions of the Hague Regulations and Fourth Geneva Convention.

∗ The author is an attorney in private practice and an adjunct faculty
member at St. Ambrose University, Davenport, Iowa. He received his J.D.
from the University of Iowa in 1998 and his LL.M. in International Human
Rights Law from the National University of Ireland, Galway, in 2002.
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II. LEGAL REGIME IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA
Prior to World War I, the Ottoman Empire controlled the territory of Palestine, which now consists of Israel and the Occupied Territories. Following the war and the fall of the Empire,
the region was entrusted to Great Britain as a League of Nations mandate.1 With this mandate set to expire, the British
Government sought the counsel of the United Nations (“UN”),
which recommended the partition of Palestine into separate
Arab and Jewish states.2 Unable to reach a compromise satisfactory to all of the parties, the British nonetheless announced
their intention to terminate the mandate on May 14, 1948.3 In
response, Jewish leaders immediately declared the establishment of the State of Israel, and war ensued.4 Emerging victorious from the war, Israel encompassed all of mandatory Palestine, with the exception of the West Bank and Gaza, which were
administered by Jordan and Egypt, respectively.5
These 1948 borders left Israel vulnerable to attack. As a result of an Egyptian military buildup on its border with Israel, in

1. See generally LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, art. 22, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/Avalon/leagcov.htm (last visited May 20, 2003)
(establishing the mandate system). The Covenant provided for “advanced
nations” to administer territories controlled by the defeated powers at the end
of World War I. Id. The mandate was to continue until such time as the territory could stand alone.
2. See G.A. Res. 181(II), UN GAOR, 2d Sess., at 131, UN Doc. A/519
(1947). The UN plan called for separate states bound together in an “economic union.” Id. Britain had already expressed its support for “the establishment in Palestine of a homeland for the Jewish people.” Ardi Imseis, On
the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44
HARV. INT’L L.J. 65, 73 (2003) (citing Letter from Arthur James Balfour, Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, to Lord Edmond de Rothschild (Nov. 2, 1917).
This letter, referred to as the Balfour Declaration, stated that this support
was contingent on the understanding that “nothing shall be done which may
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine.” Id. at 73 n.74.
3. Emma Playfair, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 4 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992) [hereinafter Playfair, Introduction].
4. ANTHONY COON, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES: DEMOLITION AND DISPOSSESSION: THE DESTRUCTION OF
PALESTINIAN HOMES 6 (1999).
5. Playfair, Introduction, supra note 3, at 4. Jordan (then known as
Transjordan) annexed the territory of the West Bank in 1950. Id.
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1967, war erupted between Israel and its neighbors.6 Israel
once again emerged as the victor and its forces occupied both
Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, at the conclusion of the brief Arab-Israeli War of 1967.7 The Israeli Knesset quickly took action to annex East Jerusalem into Israel.8
The status of Gaza and the remainder of the West Bank has
been, however, less clear. Israel has denied that its control over
these territories is an “occupation,” thus, denying that Jordan
and Egypt had previously exercised sovereignty over them.9
Rather, Israel has referred to its role in the West Bank and
Gaza as an “administration” of these territories.10
The volatile history of the West Bank and Gaza resulted in
the existence of a rather complex legal regime. In order to analyze the issues relating to housing demolition, this regime must
be examined.
A. Legislation and Administration
The following Part will outline the legal system that has developed in the territories, with particular attention paid to Israel’s legal predicates for the demolitions. This part will first
address the legislative and administrative regime that has developed in the West Bank and Gaza. It will then examine the
judicial system that has existed in the territories since 1967.
Finally, it will take a close look at the validity of the British

6. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE OCCUPATION OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME
COURT OF ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 4 (2002).
7. Id. at 5.
8. See generally Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11)
Law, 5727-1967, 1966–1967 S.H. 74, translated in 21 L.S.I. 75 (1966•67); Law
and Administration Order (No. 1), 5727-1967, 1966–1967 Kovetz Ha Takkanut (K.T.) (decreeing Israeli law, jurisdiction, and administration to be applicable in East Jerusalem). The legality of this annexation under international law was disputed by various persons and organizations, including the
United Nations. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 252, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1426th mtg.
at 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/252 (1968). Israel subsequently enacted further legislation formally annexing Jerusalem. See Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 1979–80 S.H. 186, translated in 34 L.S.I. 209 (1979–80), available at
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm.
9. See Playfair, Introduction, supra note 3, at 5.
10. See id. The term “occupied” will be used in this article, consistent with
its understood meaning in international law. See generally, id., Introduction,
supra note 3, at 3–22.
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Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 as a source of law
today.
The applicable law in the West Bank and Gaza from 1967 to
present has been influenced by a number of sources each leaving their imprint — local, imperial, and military law. This section will focus on the effect of each source on the Defense
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945 and the sources of legislation
in the territories since 1967.
1. Mandatory Palestine
Pursuant to the League of Nations mandate, Great Britain
was responsible for administering the territory of Palestine. 11
The British administration in Palestine operated under the
general structure and rules of the English legal system. Even
so, the system retained elements of Ottoman law and was also
influenced by Islamic Shari’a.12
During the mandate period, both Jewish and Arab elements
within Palestine resisted British control.13 Much of the government’s policy was, therefore, directed toward maintaining control and preserving civil order. In 1921 and 1929, ordinances
sought to alleviate Arab fears of losing property to recent Jewish settlers in the region, while the laws made in 1936 were in
direct response to revolutionary activity in Palestine.14
By 1945, British officials faced growing opposition of the Jewish underground movement.15 In direct response to this threat,
the authorities adopted the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of
1945 pursuant to the Palestine (Defense) Order-in-Council of
1937.16 The 1945 Regulations granted the government broad
powers to crush paramilitary activity.17 Applicable throughout
mandatory Palestine, authorities were given powers to suspend
basic rights, order detention and deportation, limit free expression, association, and movement, order the forfeiture or demoli11. Id.
12. See id. at 9.
13. Id.
14. George E. Bisharat, Land, Law and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 467, 500, & 515 (1994).
15. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 121.
16. Id.
17. Diana Vincent-Daviss, The Occupied Territories and International
Law: A Research Guide, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 575, 584 (1988–89).
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tion of property, and establish military courts.18 These regulations met with harsh criticism from Jewish political leaders and
lawyers.19
Prior to the expiration of the mandate, the Palestine (Revocations) Order-in-Council of 1948 was signed in London.20 This
order-in-council acted to repeal the Palestine (Defense) Orderin-Council of 1937 and the regulations promulgated pursuant to
it, including the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945.21
The effective date of repeal was May 14, 1948, the final day of
the mandate.22 The Palestine (Revocations) Order-in-Council of
1948 was published in the Government Gazette in London.23 It
was not, however, published in the official publication for the
territory, the Palestine Gazette.24 Furthermore, the Defense
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945 were never explicitly repealed
or modified by the Jordanian or Egyptian governments that
administered the West Bank and Gaza, respectively, from the
expiration of the mandate in 1948 until 1967,25 nor were housing demolitions carried out by these authorities.26
18. See generally Defense (Emergency) Regulations (1945), 1945 PALESTINE
GAZETTE (no. 1442) (Supp. 2) 1055.
19. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 121; EMMA PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ,
DEMOLITION AND SEALING OF HOUSES AS A PUNITIVE MEASURE IN THE ISRAELIOCCUPIED WEST BANK 10–11 (1987) [hereinafter PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ]. For example, at a meeting of the Jewish Lawyers association in 1946, Dr. Yaacov
Shimson Shapiro claimed the regulations were “unparalleled in any civilized
country” and destroyed “the very foundations of justice in this land.” SABRI
JIRYIS, THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 12 (1968).
20. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 121.
21. See Palestine (Revocations) Order in Council (1948) S.I. 1948/1004, at
1350–51.
22. Id.
23. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 121. In the view of the British Government, this publication effectively repealed the Palestine (Defense) Order-inCouncil of 1937. In a 1987 letter, the British Foreign Ministry confirmed that
“in view of the Palestine (Revocations) Order in Council 1948, the Palestine
(Defense) Order in Council 1937 and the Defense Regulations 1945 made under it are, as a matter of English law, no longer in force.” PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ,
supra note 19, at 33 (citing Letter from British Minister of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs, to al-Haq (Apr. 22, 1987))
24. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 121.
25. See ESTHER COHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISRAELI-OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES: 1967–1982, at 94 (1985); Julius Stone, Behind the Cease-Fire
Lines: Israel’s Administration in Gaza and the West Bank, in OF LAW AND
MAN: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HAIM H. COHN 79, 83 (Shlomo Shoham ed., 1971).
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2. Occupation
Upon entry into the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the Israeli
Defense Forces issued proclamations regarding the governance
of each area.27 The Proclamation of Assumption of Government
by the Israeli Defense Forces (“IDF”) (“Proclamation No. 1”)
stated that as a result of its effective possession of the areas,
the IDF had assumed governance over those areas.28 This proclamation formed the basis for the exercise of military government in the West Bank and Gaza.
The basis for Israeli administration and legislation in the
West Bank and Gaza was the Proclamation Regarding Government and Law (“Proclamation No. 2”) issued in each area. Proclamation No. 2 was issued by General Haim Herzog in each
area on the day in which Israeli forces entered that area.29 Under this proclamation, all legislative and administrative powers
in areas controlled by the Israeli Defense Forces were concentrated in the hands of the military commander for each area. It
stated that:
(a) All powers of government, legislation, appointment, and
administration in relation to the area or its inhabitants shall
An argument has been raised that certain provisions of the Regulations are
inconsistent with the Jordanian Constitution of 1952 and were, therefore,
implicitly repealed in the West Bank. This argument was addressed and dismissed by the Israeli Supreme Court in Awwad v. Military Commander of
Judea and Samaria, 33(3) P.D. 309 (1979), and Kawasme v. Minister of Defense, 35(1) P.D. 617 (1980). A similar argument was raised in Gaza, based on
the 1955 Basic Law for the Gaza Strip and the Constitution of Gaza of 1962,
enacted by Egypt. These arguments were also dismissed by the Israeli Supreme court in Maslam v. IDF Commander in Gaza, 45(3) P.D. 444 (1991).
For a discussion of these cases, see KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 122–24. See
also Mazen Qupty, The Application of International Law in the Occupied Territories as Reflected in the Judgments of the High Court of Justice in Israel, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 107
(Emma Playfair ed., 1992) (discussing Qawassmeh v. Minister of Defense,
35(1) P.D. 617 (1980), in which the Court questioned whether the Defense
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945 had, in fact, been repealed by the Jordanian
Constitution).
26. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 10.
27. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 92.
28. Id.
29. See Mona Rishmawi, The Administration of the West Bank under Israeli Rule, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 271–72 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
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henceforth be vested in me alone and shall only be exercised
by [the Military Governor] or by persons appointed by me for
that purpose or acting on my behalf.
(b) Without derogating from the generality of the foregoing it
is hereby provided that any duty to consult, obtain consent
and the like, prescribed in any law as a condition-precedent
for legislation, enactment or appointment, or as a condition for
the entry into force of any legislation or appointment — is
hereby repealed.30

Since 1967, Proclamation No. 2 has remained the source of all
governmental power in the West Bank and Gaza. These powers
have been wide-ranging, and include control over real estate
transaction,31 use of natural resources,32 issuance of professional
licenses,33 travel,34 and all security matters. Even when a civilian administration was established in the West Bank in 1981, it
was established by and under the authority of the area commander.35 Thus, the military government retained final and
absolute control over the territories.
3. Preservation of Pre-Occupation Law
One feature of the military government in the West Bank and
Gaza was the retention of laws in effect prior to the occupation.
This decision was evident from the 1967 proclamations establishing military rule. Proclamation No. 2 stated that:
30. Proclamation on Government and Law (Area of West Bank) (Proclamation No. 2) § 3 (June 7, 1967); Proclamation on Government and Law (Gaza
Strip and Northern Sinai) (Proclamation No. 2) § 3 (June 8, 1967).
31. See Military Order 25 (1967), summarized in English and reprinted in
JAMIL RABAH & NATASHA FAIRWEATHER, ISRAELI MILITARY ORDERS IN THE
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN WEST BANK 4 (Jerusalem Media & Communication
Centre, 1993). The reader should note that the military orders have not been
published in their entirety in English or Hebrew. This is one of the reasons
that there is frequent criticism about the transparency of the military government’s actions. Thus the compellation by the Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre is the best source of these orders in one volume. See id.
32. See id.; Military Orders 58, 59, & 92, summarized in English and reprinted in RABAH & FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 9, 14.
33. See id. Military Orders 260, 324, & 437, summarized in English and
reprinted in RABAH & FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 34, 42, & 56.
34. See, e.g., Military Order 153, summarized in English and reprinted in
RABAH & FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 22.
35. See Rishmawi, supra note 29, at 275–81 (discussing establishment of a
civilian administration in the West Bank in 1981).
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The law which existed in the area on 7 June 1967 shall remain
in force in so far as there is nothing therein repugnant to this
Proclamation, any other Proclamation or Order which will be
enacted by [the Military Governor], and subject to such modifications as may result from the establishment of the rule of
the I.D.F. in the area.36

Thus, generally speaking, the laws that existed in the West
Bank and Gaza prior to June 7, 1967, remained in force unless
amended or repealed by the area commander. An order promulgated shortly after the occupation began further stated that,
to avoid doubt, any emergency regulations previously in place
remained in force unless explicitly repealed.37 These orders left
a system of Ottoman, British Mandatory, Jordanian, and military law in the West Bank, and Ottoman, British Mandatory,
Egyptian military, and Israeli military law in Gaza.
Without analyzing the applicability or enforceability of international law at this point, it is important to note that the Israeli
decision to respect prior law conformed to international legal
norms. According to the customary international law that was
recognized at that time, “the law in force in occupied territory
must be respected by the occupying power.”38 This principle is
reflected in Article 43 of the Hague Regulations and Article 64
of the Fourth Geneva Conventions.39
B. Judicial System in the West Bank and Gaza
The examination of housing demolition requires familiarity
with the structure of the judicial system in the West Bank as
well as Gaza and in Israel. This section will first review the
nature of the judicial system in the territories under military
36. Proclamation on Government and Law (Area of West Bank) (Proclamation No. 2) § 2 (June 7, 1967); Proclamation on Government and Law (Gaza
Strip and Northern Sinai) (Proclamation No. 2) § 2 (June 8, 1967).
37. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 10. See generally Military
Order 224, art. 3 (1968), summarized in English and reprinted in RABAH &
FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 30.
38. KRETZMER supra note 6, at 123.
39. See infra Part V. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, U.S.T.S. 539, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp.
90 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter Hague Regulations]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 UNT.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth
Geneva Convention].
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government. It will then explain the role and availability of the
Israeli Supreme Court in administration of these territories.
1. Military Court System
Area commanders established a system of military justice
shortly after Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza.40 Proclamation No. 3 implemented procedural and substantive law for
“security offenses” and also created military courts with jurisdiction to try numerous matters.41 Preventative detention and
warrantless searches were also authorized.42
Along with the powers granted in earlier proclamations, this
proclamation allowed area commanders to drastically alter the
prior structure of the court system. Criminal and civil matters
previously tried in civil courts now fell under the concurrent
jurisdiction of military courts.43 In addition, the area commander assumed the power to appoint and dismiss judges and
prosecutors, even in civil courts.44 Finally, the Court of Cassation, the highest court of appeal under Jordanian rule, was
dissolved by commanders in the West Bank.45
2. Israeli Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Israel is highly regarded both in Israel
and abroad.46 The Court fulfills two roles in the Israeli judicial
system. As in many national systems, the Supreme Court of
Israel serves as the final court of appeals for decisions by Israeli
district courts.47 The Court also sits as the High Court of Justice.48

40. Raja Shehadeh, The Legislative Stages of the Israeli Military Occupation, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 152 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
41. Id. at 153.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Military Order 129, summarized in English and reprinted in
RABAH & FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 19.
45. See Shehadeh, supra note 40, at 153.
46. See Dan Simon, The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Territories, 19 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (1994).
47. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 10.
48. Id.
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The High Court of Justice is a feature of the English legal
system.49 In this system, the High Court of Justice hears petitions seeking review of government action.50 This second function was retained when the State of Israel was established upon
expiration of the British Mandate.51 Thus, when sitting as the
High Court of Justice, the Israeli Supreme Court adjudicates
the legality of state actions and its constituent parts.52
a. Jurisdiction
The power to review government actions is defined by the parameters of the Israeli Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. This
power does not necessarily give rise to the review of military
actions outside the territory of the State of Israel. Indeed, the
courts of some nations have determined that they lack jurisdiction to adjudicate petitions concerning the actions taken by
military personnel outside their own sovereign territory.53
The Israeli Supreme Court, however, has taken the view that
it has jurisdiction to review acts of the military government in
the occupied territories when sitting as the High Court of Justice.54 This authority flows from the Court’s in personam jurisdiction over individual members of the Israeli Defense Forces
acting on behalf of the Israeli Government.55 Hence, the Court
is competent to adjudicate petitions challenging these actions.
However, this broad jurisdictional scope was not the product
of judicial activism. Rather, the scope resulted from a conscious
decision by Israeli authorities not to contest petitions from the
West Bank and Gaza on jurisdictional grounds.56 The government stated that their reason for this policy was to prevent arbitrary actions; however, other motives for this decision — such

49. Id.
50. See Simon, supra note 46, at 22.
51. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 10–11 (discussing the Courts Law,
1957, which replaced the British Mandatory legislation).
52. Id.
53. See KRETZMER , supra note 6, at 19.
54. Id. at 13.
55. See Khelou v. Government of Israel, 27(2) P.D. 169, 176 (1972), summarized in English in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384 (1975).
56. See KRETZMER , supra note 6, at 20.
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as subtly increasing the legitimacy of military rule — have been
put forth as well.57
The first reported case concerning the actions of military personnel in the West Bank and Gaza, decided in 1972, did not
even address the issue of jurisdiction.58 The second decision
merely stated that the government had not contested the issue
in earlier cases.59 Jurisdiction had not been raised as an issue
and would not, therefore, be ruled on.
Within a year, the Court changed its approach. Rather than
passively ignoring the issue, the Court stated that it believed:
[W]ithout ruling on the matter, that the jurisdiction exists on
the personal level against functionaries in the military government who belong to the executive branch of the state, as
“persons fulfilling public duties according to the law,” and who
are subject to the review of this court under section 7(b)(2) of
the Courts Law, 1957.60

This view was eventually accepted as a binding rule.61 Thus,
the Court deprived the government of the opportunity to change
tactics and contest jurisdiction in a later case.
Other potential challenges to the justiciability of issues arising from the occupation include issues regarding standing, the
political question doctrine, and the act of state doctrine.62 These
issues have not, however, been used to prevent non-Israelis in
the territories from accessing the Israeli Supreme Court.63 The
Court has, therefore, become an important forum for challenges
to the actions of military authorities in the West Bank and
Gaza.

57. Id.
58. See Christian Soc’y for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defense, 26(1)
P.D. 574 (1971), summarized in English in 2 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 354 (1972).
59. See Electricity Corp. for Jerusalem District v. Minister of Defense,
27(1) P.D. 124, 136 (1972), summarized in English in 2 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
381 (1975).
60. Khelou, 27(2) P.D. at 176.
61. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 20–21, citing Ja’amait Ascan v. IDF
Commander in Judea and Samaria 37(4) P.D. 785, 809 (1982).
62. Challenges based on standing, the political question doctrine, and the
act of state doctrine have not been used as a wholesale bar to petitions from
the Occupied Territories. For a discussion of these issues, see generally
KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 21–25.
63. Id. at 25.
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b. Applicable Law
Despite Israel’s initial plans to establish a constitution, one
was never adopted. In the absence of a written constitution, the
British model of parliamentary supremacy is followed.64 While
the Israeli Supreme Court may review the correctness of the
actions of government officials, it cannot pass judgment on legislation passed by the Knesset. Primary legislation is, therefore,
the highest form of law.65
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2, all legislative powers in the
West Bank and Gaza are concentrated in the hands of the area
commander.66 In an early case from the territories brought before the Israeli Supreme Court, the government argued that
military orders should be treated as primary legislation and
should therefore fall outside the purview of judicial review.67
The Court rejected this argument, taking the view that military
orders are a form of delegated, rather than primary, legislation.68 Additionally, the Court later held that as a part of the
government administration, military commanders and their
actions should be reviewed under Israeli administrative law.69
As a national court, the Israeli Supreme Court applies Israeli
law. Any challenges brought before the Court must be based on
principles recognized in the Israeli legal system. Claims based
on public international law can be adjudicated only if the principles of international law relied upon are also a part of Israeli
domestic law.70
Under the English common law system, customary international law is a part of domestic law to the extent that it does not
conflict with parliamentary primary legislation.71 It can, therefore, be enforced in domestic courts. On the other hand, con64. See Simon, supra note 46, at 23.
65. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 21–25.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 29–35.
67. See generally Hilu v. State of Israel, 27(2) P.D. 169 (1972), summarized
in English in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384 (1975)
68. Id.
69. See Abu Itta v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria, 37(2) P.D. 197,
230–31 (1981), summarized in English in 13 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 348 (1983).
70. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 31.
71. See John Dugard, Enforcement of Human Rights in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 461 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
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ventional international law, based on multilateral treaties, is
not a part of domestic law unless expressly incorporated by parliament.72 As a result, conventional law is not enforceable in
domestic courts without enabling legislation. Thus, customary
international law is applied and enforced by the courts of Israel
and conventional international law is not.
C. Status of Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945
The use of housing demolitions has been justified in Israeli
law under the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945.73
These regulations allow for wide-ranging and draconian security measures that have been highly criticized.74 Although it
has used these powers extensively, Israel has disclaimed responsibility for the continued use of the regulations.75 Rather,
the state contended that the regulations remained in effect at
the time the West Bank and Gaza were occupied, and it was
thus bound to preserve them.76
As provisions of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945
came to be used by the Israeli Defense Forces in the West Bank
and Gaza, questions were raised concerning their continued
validity.77 Several arguments were made that the regulations
had been repealed prior to the entry of Israeli forces into the
territories.78 If this was the case, Israel would be denied of its
claim that it was bound to preserve the regulations.
Since scholars have argued that Britain effectively repealed
the regulations in the Palestine (Revocations) Order-in-Council
of 1948.79 The Israeli Supreme Court rejected this argument,
finding that the British Government’s failure to publish the
revocation order in the official Palestine Gazette was fatal to
the argument that the regulations had been repealed.80 The
72. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 31.
73. See Simon, supra note 46, at 15.
74. Id. at 15–16.
75. Id. at 15.
76. Id.
77. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 94.
78. Id. at 94–95.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 15–24 (discussing the revocation
order).
80. See Na’azal v. IDF in Judea and Samaria, 39(3) P.D. 645, 652 (1986),
summarized in English in 16 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 329 (1986).
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Court relied on the principle that “hidden laws” have no validity; therefore, the revocation never took effect.81
Scholars also argue that Jordan repealed the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 in the West Bank between 1948 and
1967.82 Specifically, the Defense of Transjordan Law was cited
as terminating the regulations.83 This position was also rejected
by the Court, which found that the regulations had remained in
continual effect since the time they were enacted by the British.84 Challenges to individual regulations promulgated under
the Defense (Emergency) Regulations have also failed.85
III. HOUSE DEMOLITIONS
Since 1967, house demolitions have been utilized as a punitive measure against residents of the West Bank and Gaza.86
This Part will explore the reasons and justifications for the use
of demolitions. It will also describe the circumstances under
which demolitions take place.
The phrase “house demolition” refers to the physical destruction of a house or portion of a house by government actors.87
The Israeli Defense Forces have conducted house demolitions
since the time the West Bank and Gaza were occupied.88 The

81. Id. The Court relied on Military Order No. 160, which stated that
“hidden laws” are invalid, but also noted that general principles of law would
lead to the same result. Id. See generally Military Order No. 160, summarized in English and reprinted in RABAH & FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 23.
82. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 94.
83. Id.
84. See Awad v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria, 33(3) P.D.
309, 313 (1979), summarized in English in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 343 (1979).
85. Id. at 314 (holding that Regulation 112 was not implicitly repealed by
Article 9 of the Constitution of Jordan); Kawasame v. Minister of Defense,
35(1) P.D. 617, 626 (1980), summarized in English in 11 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
349 (1981) (finding that Military Order No. 224 required express repeal of
regulations and, thus, Regulation 112 was still valid in Jordan); Maslam v.
IDF Commander in Gaza 45(3) P.D. 444, 455 (1991) (holding that Egyptian
enactment of the Basic Law for the Gaza Strip in 1955 and the Constitution of
Gaza in 1962 did not contradict Regulation 112).
86. See COON, supra note 4, at 2–3.
87. Id.
88. See Simon, supra note 46, at 7.
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measure is rooted in a British military practice dating to the
beginning of the twentieth century.89
Demolitions are employed for several reasons. First, houses
may be demolished because a building permit was not sought
prior to their construction.90 Second, houses are demolished for
security reasons as a part of military operations.91 Finally,
demolitions are used as a punitive measure against persons
suspected of taking part in criminal activity.92 It is this punitive
measure that will be specifically addressed in this article.
The Israeli military has clearly embraced the use of housing
demolitions in the West Bank and Gaza.93 Israel’s civilian governments have also generally supported the policy, albeit to different degrees.94 However, it is significant that these governments have supported the continued use of housing demolitions,
rather than the official adoption of them as policy.95 This political sleight-of-hand exists because Israel denies that it is responsible for implementation of the demolition policy.96 Rather,
it argues that this policy was thrust upon it and that it is, in
fact, obliged to maintain the practice.97
A. Legal Justification for Demolitions
The legal basis for housing demolitions is Regulation 119 of
the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 (“DER 119”),
promulgated during the British mandate.98 This regulation
stated that:
89. See id. at 8. House demolitions were first authorized by British commanders in South Africa during the Boer War. Id. The practice was exported
to mandatory Palestine and was used in response to Arab insurrection. Id.
Prior to expiration of the mandate, Jewish paramilitary units utilized house
demolitions against Arabs in response to attacks. Id. at 8. Interestingly, the
British never used the practice against Jews in mandatory Palestine. Id. at
8–9.
90. For a discussion of this issue, see generally COON, supra note 4, at 19.
91. Id. at 15–16.
92. Id. at 9.
93. See id. at 19.
94. See Simon, supra note 46, at 14.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 18.
97. Id.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 15•19 (discussing implementation
of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 by the British Government).
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A Military Commander may, by order, direct the forfeiture to
the government of Palestine any house, structure of land from
which he has reason to suspect that any firearm has been illegally discharged, or any bomb, grenade or explosive or incendiary article illegally thrown, or any house, structure or land
situated in any area, town, village, quarter or street the inhabitants or some of the inhabitants of which he is satisfied
have committed, or attempted to commit, or abetted the commission of, or been accessories after the fact to the commission
of, any offense against these regulations involving violence or
intimidation or any military court offenses; and when any
house, structure, or land is forfeited as aforesaid, the military
commander may destroy the house or the structure or anything in or on the house, the structure, or the land.99

A military commander was thus given the power to forfeit
and destroy a personal dwelling from which an attack was
made. Moreover, power was also conferred to destroy a house if
the inhabitants of that housing area had been involved in violent offenses. Theoretically, this allowed for the destruction of
all homes located in a village where a violent act had occurred,
regardless of the lack of connection between the house, the inhabitants of the area, and the offense.
The burden of proof required to engage this measure is quite
low. The military commander must simply have “reason to suspect” that the house has been used to fire a weapon or throw
explosives, or be “satisfied” that inhabitants of an area have
committed a violent offense.100 Additionally, there is no standard regarding the severity of the offense that must be met.101
Even relatively minor actions could fall under the scope of DER
119. Nor is ownership of the subject structure relevant.102 Finally, there is no judicial process or review; the decision lies
solely within the discretion of the military commander.103
Upon occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel adopted a
policy to preserve existing pre-occupation law.104 Among the
99. Defense (Emergency) Regulations, supra note 18, Regulation 119 [hereinafter DER 119].
100. See Simon, supra note 46, at 18.
101. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 97.
102. Id. at 98–99.
103. Id. at 99.
104. See supra Part II.A.3 (explaining the maintenance of prior law in the
occupied territories).
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laws purportedly preserved were the Defense (Emergency)
Regulations of 1945 and, more specifically, DER 119.105 Thus,
pre-occupation law has provided the justification for the use of
housing demolitions. Demolition orders issued by military
commanders clearly state that they are issued pursuant to Article 119 of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945.106
B. Practice of Demolition
Demolitions have been utilized to varying degrees since the
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. The measure
has been used more frequently in times of high tension.107 In
the years following the occupation, the first Intifada of the late
1980s and the Al-Aqsa Intifada, beginning in September 2000,
there has been a marked increase in the use of the demolition
practice.108 This section will examine the mechanics and implementation of that practice.
Soon after the occupation began, Israel began to seal homes
as an alternative to the demolition of houses in certain cases.109
In this practice, doors and windows are cemented or bolted
shut, sealing off a room or an entire building.110 Although
homes are not literally demolished, sealing is generally considered to be a form of demolition.111 Israeli Attorney General Meir
Shamgar confirmed in 1971 that in the government’s view,
“[d]emolitions are of two kinds: (a) actual demolition, or (b) eviction of a person from the building and closing of the building or
flat, without destroying it.”112 While not expressly provided for
by DER 119, it is accepted that sealing is implicitly permitted
as a less severe sanction.113

105. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 10.
106. See id. at 42–43 (providing examples of demolition orders issued by
Israeli military commanders).
107. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 97–98.
108. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 145.
109. See Simon, supra note 46, at 7.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Meir Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Territories, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 262, 275 (1971). Shamgar later became
a justice of the Israeli Supreme Court.
113. See Simon, supra note 43, at 7.
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Sealing is employed in a variety of situations. According to
Attorney General Shamgar, it is used “mainly when there are
other inhabitants in the building who have no connection to the
offense.”114 Sealing is also used when demolition cannot be carried out because of the damage to neighboring structures, such
as in the case of a single apartment in a larger complex.115 Finally, this method may be utilized in response to less severe
offenses since unlike actual demolition, sealing is potentially
reversible.116
The Israeli Defense Forces carry out demolition and sealing
orders that are issued by military commanders and reviewed by
various officials, including the Minister of Defense.117 Demolition orders are executed using explosives or an armored bulldozer,118 while sealing is accomplished using brick or metal
plates.119 These operations usually take place under the cover of
darkness or during a declared curfew to minimize interference.120 In the past, no prior notice was provided, although
families were sometimes given between a half-hour and two
hours to evacuate the home and remove possessions before
demolition.121 Intervention by the Israeli Supreme Court altered
this practice,122 although recent demolitions have again taken
place without prior notice.123
Following the demolition or sealing, families are prohibited
from using the forfeited land in any manner.124 A “closed area”
is often declared, meaning that no one may enter the property
for any reason.125 Additionally, no government assistance is

114. Id.
115. See Martin Carroll, The Israeli Demolition of Palestinian Houses in the
Occupied Territories: An Analysis of Its Legality in International Law, 11
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1195, 1196 (1990).
116. Id.
117. COHEN, supra note 25, at 99.
118. See Simon, supra note 46, at 7.
119. Id.
120. PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 5.
121. Id. at 6.
122. See infra Part III.D (discussing the Israeli Supreme Court’s treatment
of the issue).
123. See John Kifner, Israeli Court Upholds Blowing Up Houses, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2002, at A6.
124. Simon, supra note 46, at 7.
125. PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 7.
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provided to displaced families, who must instead rely on relatives, neighbors, or international organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”).126
The regulations grant the authority to demolish homes in an
area, town, village, quarter, or street that are inhabited by persons suspected of committing violent crimes,127 thus allowing the
demolition of the homes of uninvolved persons who happen to
live in an area where unrest has occurred. The Israeli Defense
Forces conducted these so-called “neighborhood punishment”
demolitions in the early years of the occupation.128 Israel has,
however, limited its application of DER 119 in recent years and
no longer demolishes the houses of uninvolved neighbors.129 Instead, demolition has been reserved for cases in which an attack
occurred from a home, or in which an inhabitant of the house
was suspected of involvement in a violent offense.130
This latter category, however, is still particularly troubling,
as the term “inhabitant” has been given a broad definition to
include persons who rarely live in a particular house.131 The
house subject to demolition need not be the primary residence of
the violent offender; often, it is a family home where an offender
previously lived.132 Prior to 1979, the Israeli Government stated
that a nexus was required between the regular occupants of the
house and the offense;133 demolitions were only carried out when
the regular occupants were aware of or in some way assisted in
the offense.134 Since that time, however, houses have been demolished in circumstances where the regular occupants were
completely unaware of the offender’s actions.135
Authorities rarely wait until the individual has been convicted of a crime to carry out the demolition. Most demolitions
take place after the inhabitant suspected of engaging in a violent offense has been arrested.136 Usually, the suspect is simply
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
See COHEN, supra note 25, at 96–97; KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 146.
COHEN, supra note 25, at 97.
See id. at 96; KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 162.
KRETZMER , supra note 6, at 146.
See COHEN, supra note 25, at 96.
Id. at 96–97.
Id.
See Simon, supra note 46, at 17.
Id.
PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 3.
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in custody, sometimes facing charges but often times not.137 In
these cases, demolition takes place in addition to other punishment under the criminal system.138
In other cases, demolitions proceed despite the fact that the
suspect cannot be found and has therefore not been arrested.139
Demolitions may even occur following the death of the suspect.140 In these circumstances, even the death of the alleged
perpetrator does not prevent demolition of his family’s home.
Additionally, ownership of the house is irrelevant. In some
cases, rented houses have been demolished based on the actions
of tenants without notice to the landlord.141 Even buildings
owned by UN agencies have been demolished pursuant to DER
119.142
The government asserts that the owners of homes that are
demolished in error have been compensated upon discovery of
the error.143 A procedure also exists which allows property owners to claim damages for injury to property.144 This claims process is administered by the military government and is not subject to review by Israeli courts.145
It is highly significant that no demolitions have been carried
out against Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza or
against homes within Israel itself, despite the fact that DER
119 remains in force in Israel as well.146 The measure has solely
been used against Palestinian homes, and only in the West
Bank and Gaza.
Furthermore, there has been a distinct lack of uniformity in
the application of DER 119 by the military government. The
practices referred to in this section are not necessarily followed,
and a great deal of discretion remains in the hands of the military commander.147 Although generalities appear to exist, no
clear standards have emerged regarding the severity of the of137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 147.
See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 3.
Id.
See COHEN, supra note 25, at 98–99.
PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 5.
See COHEN, supra note 25, at 99.
See id.
See id.
See Stone, supra note 25, at 83.
See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 146.
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fense, the connection of the suspect to the house, ownership of
the property, or the type of demolition carried out.148
C. Policy Considerations
Israel justifies this policy of housing demolitions through
DER 119, which it claims is a part of pre-occupation law.149 Regardless of the validity of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations
of 1945, this regulation at most allows demolitions; it does not
compel them. Since the occupation began, the policy decision to
carry out demolitions has been made by various Israeli governments, and has been subject to great debate.
Proponents of the policy cite its importance as an immediate
and forceful form of punishment.150 They argue that resort to
the judicial process would detract from the immediate deterrent
effect of the demolition.151 Indeed most demolitions take place a
very short time after the offense, and it cannot be denied that
blowing up a house leaves a mark on the minds of neighbors.
The demolition results in a “pillar of smoke that everyone sees,
hears, and understands.”152
Specifically, military officials have cited the effectiveness of
the demolition policy in deterring individuals from assisting
saboteurs.153 They argue that the potential punishment for
those who indirectly support and assist terrorists is essential to
the maintenance of order in the Occupied Territories.154 Interestingly, this argument seems to advocate the use of collective
punishment as an effective deterrent.
The demolition policy also serves the wider purpose of reaffirming Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza.155 House
demolitions clearly display the power of the Israeli military and
148. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 4–5.
149. See Simon, supra note 46, at 15.
150. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 100.
151. Simon, supra note 46, at 10.
152. Id. (quoting former Brigadier General Shlomo Gazit, The Administered
Territories — Policy and Actions, 204 MA’ARAHOT 25, 37 (1970) (Hebrew)). As
a Brigadier General, Gazit was involved in administration of the military
government in the early years of the occupation. Id. at 10 n.40.
153. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 97 (quoting former Brigadier General
Shlomo Gazit and former Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan’s support of demolitions to maintain order).
154. Id.
155. See Simon, supra note 46, at 10–11.
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demonstrate the response with which unrest will be met. Domestic political considerations also encourage this dramatic
show of force.156
Defenders of demolition argue that it is a lesser evil than
other forms of punishment, which might be required if it were
not used. They assert that the use of demolitions is far preferable to death penalty, which is not used by Israel.157 The demolition of a house is also claimed to be a simply a monetary punishment, and is therefore better than the detention or punishment of a person.158
These arguments are flatly rejected by critics who point out
that demolition invariably occurs in conjunction with other
forms of punishment. Offenders are still detained, convicted,
and punished in the judicial system.159 Demolition, then, represents an additional, extrajudicial punishment that is often not
even borne by the offender, but rather by his family or
neighbors.
Opponents of the policy also argue that demolitions damage
the Palestinian identity.160 Since Palestinians have historic ties
to the land, the forfeiture and demolition of homes is a particularly severe and intrusive form of punishment.161 This fact,
along with the collective nature of the punishment, serves to
alienate the Palestinian population and increase, rather than
reduce, the level of tension and violence.162
Numerous Israeli leaders have, therefore, criticized the policy, including former military leaders.163 Housing demolitions
are a source of great political debate, and have generally been
less enthusiastically supported by Israel’s Labour governments.164 Additionally, many leaders are keenly aware of the
damage the policy causes to Israel’s image in the world community.165
156. See id. at 11–12.
157. COHEN, supra note 25, at 103.
158. Id. at 101 (quoting Professor Alan Dershowitz).
159. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 3.
160. See Simon, supra note 46, at 11–12.
161. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 96.
162. See id. at 13.
163. See id. at 13–14 (profiling former military leaders who later stated
their opposition to the demolition policy).
164. Id. at 8.
165. See id. at 13 (quoting former Israeli Foreign Minister Abbas Eban).
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D. Israeli Supreme Court
Prior to 1979, the Israeli Supreme Court was uninvolved in
the demolition practice.166 Demolitions were conducted immediately overnight, and no opportunity existed for the aggrieved
party to seek judicial recourse.167 Thus, the Court had no opportunity to pass judgment on the legality of the practice.
In 1979, sitting as the High Court of Justice, the Israeli Supreme Court received its first demolition case. The facts in
Sakhwill v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region168 were favorable to the military government, arguably the
reason Israel’s Attorney General allowed the petition to reach
the Court. The petitioner’s son had been arrested for involvement in terrorist activities and had already been convicted by
the time the High Court heard the case.169 In addition, the sanction to be imposed was the sealing of one room in the house that
had been directly used in commission of the offense.170
In a brief opinion, the Court upheld the demolition order.171
Thus, the state achieved judicial endorsement of the demolition
practice. In addition to confirming that DER 119 was valid law,
the Court concluded that contradictory provisions in international humanitarian law did not prevent the military government from exercising its authority under existing local law.172
This supremacy of local law over substantive international law
would become a key aspect of the Court’s subsequent rulings.173
The next cases heard by the Court represented a gradual
broadening of the High Court’s acceptance of the demolition
practice. The Court’s second demolition decision also involved a
sealing of the rooms of two individuals who had confessed to

166. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 146.
167. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 5–6.
168. Sakhwill et al. v. Military Commander of Judea and Samaria Region,
34(1) P.D. 464 (1979), summarized in English in 10 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 345
(1980).
169. Id. at 346.
170. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 148.
171. See id.
172. Sakhawill, 34(1) P.D. at 464, quoted in Simon, supra note 46, at 28.
173. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 148. See also Simon, supra note 46, at
46.

File: FARRELL Base MacroFinal.doc

894

Created on: 6/14/2003 3:03 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:23 PM

[Vol. 28:3

serious offenses.174 Again, the premises were connected to the
offense.175 A subsequent case also involved the sealing of a
house, but without any connection between the offense and the
premises.176 This progression continued as the Court upheld the
actual demolition of the houses of families who had confessed to
murder177 and the demolition of houses of persons who had confessed to terrorist acts.178 The Court also rejected the argument
that the house must be connected to the offense or that the
other inhabitants must be aware of the terrorist activity.179
Additionally, the Israeli Supreme Court accepted the military’s broad definition of the term “inhabitant” for purposes of
DER 119.180 It upheld the demolitions of parents’ homes when
the offenders, their sons, had lived away at school most of the
year.181 The Court later stated that residence “from time to
time” was sufficient to establish residence for purposes of the
regulation.182
Families with reason to believe that their homes would be
demolished began filing early petitions challenging demolition
orders and were able to seek legal intervention prior to the execution order by military authorities.183 Often, families filed petitions after a family member had been arrested for a serious offense and they suspected that demolition would be forthcoming.184 In 1987, military authorities stated their intention to
grant administrative hearings prior to carrying out demolition
174. Khamed v. IDF Commander in Judea and Samaria 35(3) P.D. 223
(1981), discussed in KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 148.
175. Id.
176. Khamamara v. Minister of Defense, 36(2) P.D. 755 (1982), discussed in
KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 148.
177. See Khamri v. Commander in Judea and Samaria, 36(3) P.D. 439
(1982), summarized in English in 17 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 314 (1987).
178. See Muzlakh v. Minster of Defense, 36(4) P.D. 610 (1982).
179. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 154.
180. See id. at 154–55.
181. See, e.g., Khamri, 36(3) P.D. at 442, summarized in English in 17 ISR.
Y.B. HUM. RTS. 314 (1987).
182. Jabar v. Officer Commanding Central Command, 41(2) P.D. 522, 525
(1987), summarized in English in 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 252, 252–253 (1988).
183. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 155 (discussing judicial intervention
prior to 1989).
184. See, e.g., Sakhawill, 34(1) P.D. at 464, quoted in Simon, supra note 43,
at 28; Khamed, 35(3) P.D. at 223, discussed in KRETZMER, supra note 6, at
155.
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orders “except in severe and exceptional cases.”185 This policy,
however, was not followed in all cases.186
Finally, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel intervened,
filing a general petition requesting hearings in all demolition
cases.187 The Association argued that Israeli administrative law
required both a hearing and the opportunity to petition the
High Court of Justice to appeal the hearing.188 The Court
agreed with this proposition, and in Association for Civil Rights
in Israel v. Commander-in-Chief of the Central Region189 ruled
that both hearing and opportunity to petition were required.
Furthermore, the Court rejected the military request to maintain an exception in severe cases, declaring instead that the
military could temporarily seal houses in such cases, pending
judicial review.190
Since this 1989 ruling, the Court has routinely reviewed petitions pursuant to this ruling.191 This judicial oversight has reduced the overall number of demolition orders issued by military commanders.192 Nonetheless, the Court has interfered with
very few of the demolition orders that it has reviewed.193 Generally the Court limited its review to the procedural legality of the
decision to issue a demolition order, without addressing the
merits of that decision.194 Other issues have been dismissed.
For example, the Court has rejected arguments challenging the

185. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 155 (citing Zaid v. IDF Commander in
Judea & Sumaria, 1987(2) Takdin-Elyon 53).
186. See id. at 156.
187. See id.
188. Id.
189. Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Commander-in-Chief of the
Central Region, 43(2) P.D. 529, summarized in English in 23 ISR. Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 294, 296 (1993).
190. Id . One exception was allowed, although it is not applicable to punitive
demolitions. The Court ruled that hearing could be bypassed in “operational
military circumstances in which judicial review is incompatible with conditions of place and time or the nature of the circumstances.” Id. at 540–41. See
generally supra text accompanying note 90-92 (discussing the three reasons
housing demolitions are utilized.)
191. See Simon, supra note 46, at 32.
192. See id. at 36.
193. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 157.
194. Id. at 158.
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effectiveness of demolition as a deterrent.195 Thus, military
commanders were left with considerable discretion despite the
opportunity for judicial review.
One of the rare cases in which the Court did review the decision to issue a demolition order occurred in Turkmahn v. Minister of Defense.196 In that case, the perpetrator was convicted of
murder, and authorities issued an order to demolish the house
where he lived with his mother, seven unmarried siblings, and
a married sibling’s family.197 Although demolitions had been
upheld in cases with similar factual backgrounds,198 for the first
time, the Court adopted a proportionality test.199 It found that
demolition of the entire house would be a disproportionate punishment, and ordered that only two of three rooms in the house
could be sealed.200
Experts have been puzzled over the Court’s sudden interventionist approach and its distinction between nuclear family and
a sibling’s separate family.201 The decision, however, generally
restricted demolitions to the home of an offender’s nuclear family.202 Moreover, authorities became more likely to seal individual rooms in multi-unit buildings than to destroy the entire
building.203
The relative restraint created by judicial review has suffered
greatly as the Al-Aqsa Intifada has progressed. Military authorities have begun to bypass the requirement of hearing and

195. See generally Aga v. IDF Commander in Gaza, 44(1) P.D. 536 (1989),
summarized in English in 23 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 330 (1993). Arguments
based on substantive international law have likewise been rejected, as will be
discussed in the following parts of this Article.
196. Turkmahn v. Minister of Defense, 48(1) P.D. 217 (1991).
197. See id.
198. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 160.
199. See Simon, supra note 46, at 35.
200. See Turkmahn, 48(1) P.D. at 220–21.
201. See Simon, supra note 46, at 36–37; KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 160–
61.
202. See Simon, supra note 46, at 36.
203. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 161. The Israeli military is viewed as
being conscious of its image and concerned about maintaining its legitimacy.
Because of this concern, it seeks to avoid criticism from the High Court of
Justice and generally avoids actions that it believes the Court would not condone. See Simon, supra note 46, at 37.
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appeal, and instead resumed immediate demolitions.204 A judicial challenge to this practice by 43 families proved unsuccessful. 205 In a 2002 decision the Israeli Supreme Court held that
because Israel is “in the midst of combat activity” the notice and
appeal requirement introduced in Association for Civil Rights in
Israel may be suspended.206 Suspension is warranted when
“there is a serious fear that awarding the right of hearing will
endanger the lives of soldiers and endanger the action itself.”207
Days later, the Court issued a decision stating that in such circumstances, petitioners should make their case directly to the
military commander rather than the Court.208 It is uncertain
whether the Court will resume judicial review of demolition
cases in the future.
E. Statistics
It is difficult to compile accurate statistics regarding punitive
house demolitions by the Israeli Defense Forces for a number of
reasons. First, government figures and those compiled by nongovernmental organizations have historically differed, indicating that these groups are inconsistent in how or what they
count.209 Second, access to areas of the West Bank and Gaza is
frequently restricted, making verification of demolitions difficult for relief workers, human rights advocates, and nongovernmental personnel.210 Third, substantial portions of vil-

204. See PALESTINIAN CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET: CRIMES
AGAINST HOUSING AND AGRICULTURE (2002); B’Tselem, House Demolitions —
Statistics, at http://www. btselem.org/English/House_Demolitions/Statistics.
asp (last visited Mar. 11, 2003).
205. Nahil Adal Saadu Amar et al. v. IDF Commander in the West Bank,
HCJ 6696/02 (Aug. 5, 2002). See also Kifner, supra note 123, at A6; Dan Izenberg, Court Approved Destruction of Terrorist’s Families Homes, JERUSALEM
POST, Aug. 7, 2002, at 1.
206. Amar, 6696/02, ¶ 2. See also Kifner, supra note 123, at A6.
207. Amar, 6696/02, ¶ 5.
208. Mahmud Aida Aadi Salah A Din v. IDF Commander of the West Bank,
6868/02 (Aug. 8, 2002).
209. See SHANE DARCY, AL HAQ, ISRAEL’S PUNITIVE HOUSE DEMOLITION
POLICY: COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8
(2003), available at http://www.alhaq.org/publications/index.htm (last visited
May 31, 2003).
210. Jeff Halper, The Key to Peace: Dismantling the Matrix of Control, at
http://www.icahd.org (last visited May 12, 2003.
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lages or neighborhoods were demolished in the early years of
the occupation, creating a situation where counting individual
homes was not feasible.211 Finally, the distinction between
houses demolished for punitive reasons and those demolished in
security operations or for building permit violations is sometimes difficult to survey and is often ignored by mass media
sources or even non-governmental organizations. Thus, figures
reported by these entities may include houses demolished for
differing reasons.
Accurate accounting for the early years of the occupation is
the most difficult. For example, the Israeli Government reported that 1,265 houses were demolished between 1967 and
1981.212 Meanwhile, the ICRC found that 1,224 houses were
demolished between 1967 and 1978.213
In more recent years, figures show that a significant number
of demolitions were carried out between 1988 and 1991 at the
height of the first Intifada.214 Demolitions were used sparingly
after the Oslo accords and at the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada.215 Recent suicide bombings, however, have resulted in a
substantial increase in punitive demolitions with twenty houses
demolished between August 2 and August 9, 2002.216 Figure 1 is
one non-governmental organization’s documentation of demolitions and sealings pursuant to DER 119 since the beginning of
the first Intifada in 1987.

211. See DARCY, supra note 209, at 8.
212. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 145.
213. DARCY, supra note 209, at 8.
214. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 145.
215. See infra Figure 1.
216. Jonathan Steele, Israeli ‘Restraint’ Still Means Terror for the Palestinians, GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 2002, at 16. See also John Kifner, Militants Reject
Policy on Attacks in Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2002.
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Figure 1: Demolitions and Sealings from 1987 until 2002217
Year

Complete
Partial
Demolitions
Demolitions
1987*
1
0
1988
125
24
1989
144
18
1990
107
11
1991
46
4
1992
8
2
1993
1
2
1994
0
1
1995
0
0
1996
11
0
1997
6
0
1998
0
0
1999
0
0
2000
0
0
2001
8
1
2002
187
1
2003†
89
0
733
64
Totals
* Beginning December 9, 1987.
† Through April 29, 2003.

Complete
Sealings
N/A
39
76
97
34
25
18
4
1
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
3
299

Partial
Sealings
N/A
26
27
11
20
16
15
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
118

Additionally, another non-governmental organization found
that only 8.4% of homes demolished between 1981 and 1991
were owned by the offender.218 The remaining homes were
owned by family members, third parties, or were rented.219 Figure 2 shows the ownership of homes in cases before the Israeli
Supreme Court through 1989.

217. B’Tselem, supra note 204.
218. LYNN WELCHMAN, A THOUSAND AND ONE HOMES: ISRAEL’S DEMOLITION
AND SEALING OF HOUSES IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES 6 (1993).
219. Id.
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Figure 2: Ownership of 145 homes in adjudicated cases220

Number
Percent

Offender
7
4.8

Parents
69
47.6

Siblings
16
11.0

Relative
9
6.2

Rental
6
4.1

Unknown
38
26.2

Finally, Israeli citizens make up approximately 10% of the
population in the Occupied Territories.221 Yet, only Palestinian
homes have been demolished pursuant to DER 119.222 The
measure has not been used against Jews living in the West
Bank and Gaza, nor has it been used inside of Israel, where
DER 119 also remains in force.223
IV. HOUSE DEMOLITIONS AS A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW
This Part analyzes the legality of punitive demolitions under
international human rights law. Human rights law is concerned with the relationship of the state to its own people.224
Thus, it is often overlooked in favor of humanitarian law, which
is the law of armed conflict, when discussing the West Bank
and Gaza.225 However, the implications of humanitarian law are
still relevant and important to the dialogue. In fact, many
scholars consider humanitarian law to be a branch of human
rights law.226
Human rights law is sometimes assumed to be inapplicable in
situations of armed conflict. This assumption is based on the
fact that territorial or jurisdictional issues may limit the application of human rights law, and that derogations from interna220. See Simon, supra note 46, at 17.
221. Online Newshour, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (the website of the
Newshour with Jim Lehrer), at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/
conflict/map.html (last visited May 21, 2003).
222. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 10–11.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2(1),
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 UNT.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
225. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39.
226. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 1–3. But see JEAN PICTET, HUMANITARIAN
LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 13 (1975) (stating that human
rights is a branch of humanitarian law).
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tional instruments may minimize their protection during periods of conflict.227 Still, the prevailing view is that human rights
law, when applicable, is available to supplement humanitarian
law.228 This argument is particularly persuasive during prolonged periods of occupation.229 This Part will examine the application of human rights law, analyze DER 119 under it, and
discuss the enforcement of human rights provisions.
A. Application
The most significant instrument in international human
rights law is the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”).230 This instrument was signed by Israel on
December 19, 1966, and was ratified on October 3, 1991.231 The
instrument took effect with regard to Israel on the date it was
ratified.
Some scholars dispute the application of the ICCPR to the
conflict regions, arguing that this treaty only governs the relationship of a state to its own nationals and not those in occupied
territories.232 While true in some situations, this argument does
not hold true in the West Bank and Gaza. Article 2(1) of the
ICCPR states that “[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals in its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant.”233 The nature of the prolonged occupation
and Israel’s insistence that no other nation exercised sovereign
power in the territories prior to the occupation lead to the conclusion that the territories should be considered Israeli territory
for purposes of Article 2(1). In any event, Palestinians living in
the West Bank and Gaza are clearly subject to the jurisdiction

227. COHEN, supra note 25, at 4–5.
228. Id. at 3–4.
229. Id.
230. ICCPR, supra note 224.
231. Id. (Ratification Index).
232. See, e.g., H. Meyrowitz, Le Droit de la Guerre et les Droits de l’Homme,
88 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A
L’ETRANGER 1059, 1104 (1972) (suggesting that human rights law does not
protect enemy nationals).
233. ICCPR, supra note 224, art. 2(1).
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of the Israeli military government234 and are thus entitled to
protection of the rights enumerated in the ICCPR.
The ICCPR provides that a State Party may derogate from its
obligations under the treaty in a “time of public emergency
which threatens the life of the nation.”235 Derogation is only
permissible “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of
the situation.”236 Furthermore, no derogation is permitted with
regard to certain enumerated articles,237 and notice of derogation must be given to all other States Parties.238
Israel submitted notice of derogation to the SecretaryGeneral of the Untied Nations on October 3, 1991, the same day
that it ratified the ICCPR.239 The notice stated that a state of
emergency had existed in Israel since its independence in 1948
due to “threats of war, of actual armed attacks, and campaigns
of terrorism resulting in the murder of and injury to human
beings.”240 In order to defend itself and protect life and property,
Israel stated that powers of arrest and detention inconsistent
with ICCPR Article 9 were required.241 The notice asserted that
Israel would derogate to the extent that measures it utilized
were inconsistent with Article 9.242 No further derogation was
made.
With the exception of Article 9, the ICCPR applies to Israel.
Thus, these same provisions apply in areas subject to its jurisdiction, including the West Bank and Gaza. The next section
will examine whether punitive demolitions violate these provisions.

234. See supra Part II (describing the legal regime in the West Bank and
Gaza).
235. ICCPR, supra note 224, art. 4(1).
236. Id.
237. No derogation is permitted from articles 6, 7, 8(1), 8(2), 11, 15, 16 and
18. Id. art. 4(2).
238. Id. art. 4(3).
239. Notice of Derogation submitted by Israel to the Secretary-General, Oct.
3, 1991.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. Article 9 generally deals with powers of arrest and detention.
ICCPR, supra note 224, art. 9.
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B. Analysis
The ICCPR is considered to be a strong statement of individual rights.243 Not surprisingly, though, it contains no express
prohibition against housing demolitions.244 However, it can be
reasonably construed from the language of several articles of
the ICCPR that the demolition practice is contrary to its terms.
The most obvious starting point is Article 17. It states that
“[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his . . . home . . . .”245 This article also guarantees protection of the law from such interference.246 Still, Article 17 fails
to offer significant protection. So long as demolitions are pursuant to DER 119, they are not unlawful. The argument that
demolitions are carried out arbitrarily would also likely fail as
they are based on the reasonable suspicion of the military commander.247
A stronger argument against demolitions can be made under
Article 7 of the ICCPR. This article states that “[n]o one shall
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”248 Article 7 is considered one of the
core rights protected under the human rights scheme and cannot be derogated from in any circumstances.249 It is entirely
reasonable that the demolition of a person’s home can be considered a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or
treatment.250 This practice leaves families without shelter, and
frequently personal possessions are destroyed in the process as
well.251 Additionally, in over 90% of cases, demolitions are imposed on a homeowner who is not the offender.252

243. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT (Henry Steiner & Philip
Alson eds., 2d ed. 2000); Brian Farrell, South Africa and Affirmative Action:
The Legality of the Employment Equity Act Under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 5 TRINITY COL. L. REV. 202, 212 (2002).
244. See generally ICCPR, supra note 224, art. 9.
245. Id. art. 17(1).
246. Id. art. 17(2).
247. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 145–46.
248. ICCPR, supra note 224, art. 7.
249. See id. art. 4(2) (prohibiting derogation from Article 7).
250. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 147.
251. See, e.g., Selçuk & Asker v. Turkey, 1998-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 477, ¶ 74.
252. See WELCHMAN, supra note 218, at 6.
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A precedent exists for this conclusion. Article 3 of the European Convention, like Article 7 of the ICCPR, prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.253 As with its
ICCPR counterpart, Article 3 is also nonderogable.254 The European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”) has held that
the punitive demolition of an individual’s house in certain circumstances constitutes inhuman punishment.255 This determination depends on the circumstances of the case.256
The European Court has made clear that the prohibition
against inhuman treatment is one of the most fundamental of
rights.257 States are absolutely compelled to respect this norm
“[e]ven in the most difficult of circumstances, such as the fight
against organised terrorism and crime.”258 Presumably, this
requirement would apply to situations of armed conflict as well.
C. Enforcement
Israel follows the English common law rule regarding the relationship between domestic courts and international law.259
While customary international law is enforceable in domestic
courts, conventional international law is not unless incorporated into domestic law.260 The ICCPR has not been incorporated into Israeli domestic law and cannot, therefore, be enforced in Israel’s courts. Likewise, no international tribunal
has the competence to directly enforce the provisions of the
covenant in Israel.261 Article 2(3)(a) requires each State Party to
ensure that a person whose rights are violated “shall have an
effective remedy,”262 this lack of a forum may in itself be a violation of the ICCPR.

253. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, art. 3, 213 UNT.S. 221, 224.
254. Id. art. 15(2), 213 U.N.T.S. at 232.
255. See, e.g., Selçuk & Asker v. Turkey, 1998-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 477, ¶ 74.
256. Id. ¶ 76. The Court has taken into account such factors as the age of
the occupants, the economic situation of the family, the motivation of government forces, and assistance available following demolition. Id. ¶ 77.
257. Id. ¶ 75.
258. Id.
259. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 31.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
261. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 243, at 987.
262. ICCPR, supra note 224, art. 2(3)(a).
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An important point should be made regarding enforcement.
The enforceability of a provision of international law is distinct
from the applicability of the provision.263 The inability to enforce Article 7 of the ICCPR does not alter the conclusion that it
is applicable. A violation of Article 7 remains a violation of Article 7, despite the lack of enforcement. While true that on a
personal level an individual has no available remedy,264 on a
higher level, the political and moral effect of recognition of the
violation should not be dismissed.
V. HOUSE DEMOLITIONS AS A VIOLATION OF HUMANITARIAN LAW
The strongest arguments against housing demolitions are
made under international humanitarian law. Generally, humanitarian law applies in situations of armed conflict. One
subset of humanitarian law is the law of belligerent occupation.
The humanitarian law relevant to the discussion of housing
demolitions can be found in two instruments, the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention.265 Israel applies the
Hague Regulations in domestic law but does not consider demolitions pursuant to DER 119 to violate this body of law.266 The
Fourth Geneva Convention provides the stronger legal basis
against demolitions, but Israel denies its application.267 This
Part will first examine the application of the Hague Regulations
and then consider applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
A. Hague Regulations
The conventions signed at The Hague in 1907 represent one
of the most significant events in the development of humanitarian law.268 Of interest to this discussion are the regulations annexed to the fourth convention,269 commonly known as the
263. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 34–35.
264. See id.
265. Simon, supra note 43, at 46–47.
266. Id. at 47.
267. Id. at 48.
268. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 2 (2001).
269. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, U.S.T.S. 539, 2 A.J.I.L. Supp. 90 (entered into force
Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV)]

File: FARRELL Base MacroFinal.doc

906

Created on: 6/14/2003 3:03 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:23 PM

[Vol. 28:3

Hague Regulations.270 The Regulations contain rules pertaining
to the authority of an army over the territory of a hostile state,
the foundation of the law of belligerent occupation.271
1. Application of Regulations by the Israeli Supreme Court
Following the occupation, the Israeli Supreme Court initially
avoided ruling on the applicability of the Hague Regulations to
the West Bank and Gaza.272 When the Court finally did address
the issue, the Court ruled that the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions were both conventional law and as such were
unenforceable in Israeli courts.273 This ruling ignored the nearuniversal view that the Hague Regulations were considered
customary law, a fact that was immediately pointed out by Israel’s academic community.274
Eventually, the Court corrected its error. In Ayyub v. Minister of Defense,275 the Court recognized the status of the Hague
Regulations as customary international law. As customary,
rather than conventional, international law, the Regulations
would be applicable and enforceable in Israel’s domestic courts.
This pronouncement forced the Court to address a second issue: the status of the West Bank and Gaza. According to Section III of the Hague Regulations, the regulation protections
apply to territory occupied by a hostile army.276 The Court answered this question directly, holding that Israeli military’s re270. Hague Regulations, supra note 39, at Annex.
271. Id.
272. See, e.g., Christian Society for the Holy Places v. Minister of Defense,
26(1) P.D. 574 (1971), summarized in English in 2 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 354–56
(1972); Electricity Corporation for Jerusalem District, Ltd. V. Minister of Defense 27(1) P.D. 124 (1972), summarized in English in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
381–83 (1975).
273. Hilu v. State of Israel, 27(2) P.D. 169, 180 (1972), summarized in English in 5 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 384 (1975) (commonly referred to as the Rafiah
Approach Case). See generally supra text accompanying notes 71–72 (explaining the distinction between customary and conventional international law in
the Israeli system).
274. See generally Yoram Dinstein, The Judgment in the Rafiah Approach
Case, 3 TEL AVIV U.L. REV. 934 (1974) (Hebrew). Dinstein’s article is credited
with almost single-handedly changing the Court’s view on this issue. See
KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 36.
275. Ayyub v. Minister of Defense, 33(2) P.D. 113 (1978), summarized in
English in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337, 341 (1979).
276. See Hague Regulations, supra note 39, § III.

File: FARRELL Base MacroFinal.doc

2003]

Created on: 6/14/2003 3:03 PM

Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:23 PM

PALESTINIAN HOUSE DEMOLITION

907

lationship to the territories was that of an “occupying power.”277
Thus, the Court concluded that the protections of the Hague
Regulations applied in the territories and were domestically
enforceable.278
The Court’s application of the Hague Regulations with regard
to housing demolitions, however, has essentially been limited to
invocation of Article 43.279 This article states that:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed
into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the
measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.280

This provision, along with a similar clause in the Fourth Geneva Convention, formed the basis of the Court’s “local law doctrine.”281
Following the occupation, the military government issued a
proclamation concerning the continued validity of pre-existing
law in the territories.282 One effect of this proclamation was the
validation of DER 119, the basis for housing demolitions.283
When confronted with challenges to DER 119 based on substantive provisions of the Hague Regulations, the Court has simply
declared the primacy of local law over such provisions, presumably pursuant to Article 43.284
As a result, the Israeli Supreme Court has not analyzed housing demolitions under the substantive provisions of the Hague
Regulations. Rather, it has used Article 43 to justify the continued validity of DER 119.285 The Court has made no attempt
to explain the apparent inconsistency between application of

277. Ayyub, 33(2) P.D. at 117, summarized in English in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 337, 339.
278. See id. at 341.
279. See Simon, supra note 46, at 46–47.
280. Hague Regulations, supra note 39, art. 43.
281. Simon, supra note 46, at 46–47.
282. See supra Part II.A.3. (discussing the preservation of pre-occupation
law).
283. See supra Part III.A. (explaining the legal justification for demolitions).
284. Simon, supra note 46, at 47.
285. See Jabar v. Officer Commanding Central Command, 41(2) P.D. 522,
525 (1987), summarized in English in 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 252–53 (1988).
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one article and the disregard for other substantive articles.286 It
appears, then, that arguments made under other articles of the
Hague Regulations will continue to be dismissed without being
fully addressed.
2. Analysis of the Regulations
Generally, the Hague Regulations are not as protective as the
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, strong
arguments can be made under the regulations, and their acceptance as customary international law is significant.287 It is also
of great importance that the Israeli Supreme Court has recognized the application and enforceability of the Hague Regulations, regardless of the use of the local law doctrine to limit application of the Regulations with regard to housing demolitions.288
In utilizing the local law doctrine, the Israeli Supreme Court
has not addressed Article 43 directly.289 Several academic writers, however, have suggested that the Article 43 requirement
that existing law be respected preempts other substantive provisions of the regulations.290 This argument runs contrary to the
intent and purpose of the Hague Convention as a whole. The
requirement that the occupier respect existing law is intended
to protect the population of the occupied territory, not bestow
the occupier with draconian powers it would otherwise lack.291
It is significant that with respect to laws, the drafters of the
regulations chose the term “respect” rather than to “maintain”
or to “enforce” laws previously in force. Even if one were to concede that there is an absolute obligation to respect DER 119 as
pre-existing law regardless of contrary provisions, Article 43
certainly does not compel the use of the law, which runs contrary to other substantive provisions of the regulations.

286. However, several academics, particularly Professor Julius Stone, have
attempted to explain the inconsistency. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 25, at 97.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 273–74; see also infra text accompanying notes 396–398 (noting the near-universal view that the Hague Regulations represent customary international law).
288. See Simon, supra note 46, at 46–47.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 280, 282, & 285.
290. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 25, at 96–97.
291. See Simon, supra note 46, at 52–53.
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Additionally, Article 50 of the Hague Regulations prohibits
collective punishment. It states that “[n]o general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on
account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible.”292 This article has
been broadly characterized as a “principle of individual responsibility.”293
The protection of Article 50 applies to individuals who are not
jointly and severally responsible for an offense. Clearly in
many circumstances, individuals who have no knowledge of or
connection to the illegal activity are punished along with the
offender despite their innocence.294 It cannot be denied that in
some cases, parents, family members, or friends may be aware
of the offender’s illegal activity and actively assist, tacitly support, or willingly ignore the conduct.295 However, even if these
individuals might be jointly and severally responsible, the protections of Article 50 are not denied to others who are innocent.296 Moreover, military officials do not attempt to make a
determination on the complicity of other residents of a house
that is to be demolished.297
The use of the term “population” in Article 50 may lead to the
conclusion that collective punishment is prohibited only in
situations where a wide group of people is punished, such as
when all residents of a village are made to suffer for the actions
of one resident. However, such a reading is inconsistent with
the purposes of the Hague Convention, which seek to preserve
the “interests of humanity.”298 Demolitions sometimes leave

292. Hague Regulations, supra note 39, art. 50.
293. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
CUSTOMARY LAW 47 (1991).
294. See supra Figure 2 (showing statistics regarding ownership of demolished houses).
295. Id.
296. See Simon, supra note 46, at 55–56.
297. See id. at 56.
298. Hague Convention (IV), supra note 269, at pmbl. Under international
law, when a treaty’s terms are inconclusive, they should be interpreted in
light of the treaty’s context and purpose. See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 UNT.S. 331, 340 (entered into force
Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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dozens of people homeless;299 surely a family relationship should
not dilute these interests.
In response to the argument that housing demolitions might
not be considered collective punishments, one must then turn to
the Martens Clause, at the beginning of the Convention. The
clause provides that:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued,
the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare
that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by
them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations,
as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the
public conscience.300

Thus, it cannot simply be argued that no prohibition against
housing demolitions exists in the enumerated articles of the
Regulations. Instead, this clause requires further recourse to
state practice, the laws of humanity, and public conscience.
Conceivably, these sources can be found in conventional international law, including the Geneva Conventions.301
The prohibition against collective punishment should be understood to include non-individual punishment that extends to
the offender’s family.302 The case for protection of family is bolstered by Article 46 of the Regulations, which states that
“[f]amily honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property . . . must be respected.”303 Such values must be considered when attempting to discern the correct definition of the
term “population.”304 This article goes on to declare that
“[p]rivate property cannot be confiscated,”305 another indication
of the protection afforded by the regulations.
The sanctity of private property is most strongly stated in an
unlikely place. Article 56 declares that the “property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and
education, the arts and sciences, even when State property,
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See Simon, supra note 46, at 53.
Hague Convention (IV), supra note 269.
See Simon, supra note 46, at 53.
Id. at 55.
Hague Regulations, supra note 39, art. 46.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 298, art. 31(2)(b).
Hague Regulations, supra note 39, art. 46.
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shall be treated as private property.”306 This treatment as private property means that “[a]ll seizure of, destruction or willful
damage done to institutions of this character . . . is forbidden. .
. .”307 This language demonstrates that private property deserves the utmost protection. Places of worship, educational
institutions, and museums are protected in the Regulations by
elevating them to the same category as private property.
It is universally agreed that the Hague Regulations apply to
the West Bank and Gaza, and this fact has been confirmed by
the Israeli Supreme Court.308 The Court has also declared that
the Regulations are enforceable in domestic courts.309 This recognition by the Court is of incredible significance as it eliminates any questions regarding application.
The Court has, of course, used the local law doctrine to limit
application with regard to housing demolitions.310 This limitation, however, is not soundly based in the law of the Hague
Regulations and only affects enforcement in Israeli courts.
Again, while affecting individual petitions arising from the territories, this limitation does not affect the terms of the Regulations. Although the Israeli Supreme Court has a monopoly on
enforcement of the Hague Regulations in the West Bank and
Gaza, the Court does not have a monopoly on the definitive interpretation of the Regulations.311
B. Fourth Geneva Convention
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 offer the most extensive
statement of the laws of armed conflict. The Conventions attempted to redress weaknesses in the humanitarian law regime
that became apparent during World War II.312 As a result, the
provisions of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War313 (“Fourth Geneva Conven306. Id. at art. 56 (emphasis added).
307. Id. (emphasis added).
308. See Simon, supra note 46, at 19.
309. Id. at 20.
310. Id. at 47–48.
311. Id. at 52–53.
312. See JEAN PICTET, COMMENTARY — IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 3–4 (Major Ronald Griffin & Mr. C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958).
313. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39.
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tion”) are more detailed and comprehensive than the civilian
protections contained in the Hague Regulations.314
Unlike the Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention is not a universally accepted statement of customary international law.315 However, individual provisions of the Convention are considered by many to be expressive of international
custom.316 In any event, the Convention is widely accepted and
has been ratified by more states than even the UN Charter.317
This section will examine the practice of housing demolitions
against the framework of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The
application of this Convention to the West Bank and Gaza will
be explained from the perspectives of the Israeli Government
and the Israeli Supreme Court before being independently analyzed. The provisions of individual articles of the Convention
impacting housing demolition will be reviewed, taking into account the positions of the government, academics, nongovernmental organizations and international institutions.
Conclusions will then be drawn as to the applicability of these
individual articles.
1. Application
Israel, Jordan, and Egypt are all parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention.318 Each of these nations ratified the convention before 1967.319 There is no doubt that they are “High Contracting Parties,” the term used to describe parties to the Convention.320 The Convention is therefore binding on each of them.
Complex issues arise regarding application of the Convention
to the West Bank and Gaza. Although the Convention is binding on each of the states involved, the provisions are only applicable in certain circumstances. Pursuant to Article 2, the protections of the Convention “shall apply to all cases of declared
war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war
314. See PICTET, supra note 312, at 225.
315. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 36.
316. See MERON, supra note 293, at 5 n.5.
317. Id. at 4.
318. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, at 396, 387.
KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 34.
319. Id.
320. Id.

See also
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is not recognized by one of them.”321 In addition, the Convention
applies “to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory
of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets
with no armed resistance.”322
a. Position of Israeli Government
Upon entry of Israeli forces into the West Bank, the military
commander for the region issued a proclamation regarding the
assumption of power by the Israeli military.323 Appended to the
proclamation was an order regarding the establishment of the
legal system for the region. This order included a statement
that required military tribunals to:
[A]dhere to the terms of the Geneva Convention of 12 August
1949 concerning the protection of civilians during war and regarding all matters relating to judicial procedure. If there is a
contradiction between this order and the above-mentioned
Convention then the regulations of the Convention will take
precedent.324

Thus, the provisions of the Convention were incorporated into
the military law of the region.325
The military government soon repealed this order, presumably in response to political pressure to view the territories as
“liberated” rather than “occupied.”326 An influential academic
work provided a legal basis for this change.327 Authored by Professor Yehuda Blum, the article discussed the application of
international law governing belligerent occupation. Blum understood the law of belligerent occupation to be based on the
assumption that the ousted party had sovereignty over the territory in question.328 Specifically, he questioned whether the

321. Id. art. 2.
322. Id.
323. See supra Part II.A.2.
324. Military Proclamation 3, art. 35 (1967), summarized in English and
reprinted in RABAH & FAIRWEATHER, supra note 31, at 1.
325. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 32.
326. Id.
327. See generally Yehuda Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on
the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISR. L. REV. 279 (1968).
328. Id. at 293–94.
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West Bank had been the sovereign territory of Jordan prior to
1967.329
Blum argued that the 1950 annexation of the West Bank by
Jordan was not legitimate under international law, and thus,
the West Bank had not been the sovereign territory of another
state in 1967.330 As a result, the West Bank had not been the
“territory of a High Contracting Party,” despite its effective control by Jordan, and did not meet the Article 2 requirements for
application of the Convention.331 As one of the purposes of the
Convention is to protect the reversionary rights of the previous
sovereign, the article concluded that provisions aimed at preserving these rights were inapplicable.332 Blum did, however,
suggest that Israel was still bound by the humanitarian protections of the Convention.333
This argument is the foundation of the Israeli Government’s
position regarding application of the Convention to the West
Bank and Gaza. Following the article’s publication, the government adopted the stance that as a whole the Fourth Geneva
Convention did not apply to the West Bank and Gaza.334 This
view was based on the legitimate premise that although occupied by Jordan and Egypt respectively, these regions had not
been the sovereign territory of their respective states.335 At the
same time, Israel stated its intention to comply with the Con-

329. Id. at 280–81.
330. Id. at 281–95.
331. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 32.
332. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 43.
333. See generally Blum, supra note 327.
334. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 33. A review of statements made by
Israeli representatives before the United Nations suggests that Israel might
have considered the issue unresolved until 1977, after which it clearly rejected
application. See Adam Roberts, Prolonged Military Occupation: The IsraeliOccupied Territories 1967–1988, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 45 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992).
Cohen states that Israel’s Labour governments have generally considered the
question of applicability unanswered, while Likud governments have viewed
the Convention as inapplicable. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 44.
335. For a discussion of the status of the West Bank and Gaza between 1948
and 1967, see generally COHEN, supra note 25, at 44–51 (suggesting that these
regions were not sovereign territory prior to 1967). Incidentally, no issues
regarding sovereignty arise in application of the Hague Regulations.
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vention’s humanitarian provisions.336 Generally speaking, Israel
has done so.337
One exception to this compliance policy has been the provisions potentially prohibiting the continued use of DER 119 as a
punitive measure.338 Israel has maintained that Article 64 of
the Convention concerning pre-existing law requires the state
to apply DER 119 despite the fact that demolitions may run
contrary to other substantive provisions of the Convention.339
Although officials sometimes offer arguments as to why demolitions do not violate individual provisions of the Convention, the
official position is that these other provisions are superceded by
DER 119 pursuant to Article 64.340
b. Treatment by Israeli Supreme Court
It is often noted that the Israeli Supreme Court has not ruled
that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the West
Bank and Gaza.341 It is less often mentioned that the Court has
never ruled that the Convention is not applicable. The Court
has, essentially, avoided the issue. Despite the fact that the
Convention has been raised in numerous petitions, the Court
has never directly ruled on its applicability.342 For the most
part, the vast body of academic literature on the topic has been
ignored in the opinions of the Court.343
Since Israel has agreed to voluntarily abide by the Convention, the Court is somewhat limited in its ability to review individual articles.344 The approval of the Attorney General must be
secured before the Court examines an issue arising from a voluntary application.345 Generally, this approval has been limited

336. See Roberts, supra note 334, at 44–45.
337. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 44.
338. Simon, supra note 46, at 46.
339. Id. at 47.
340. Id. at 48.
341. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 54.
342. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 54. It should be remembered, though,
that the Court has held that Israel’s status in the West Bank and Gaza is that
of a belligerent occupant. See Ayyub v. Minister of Defense, 33(2) P.D. 113,
117 (1978), summarized in English in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337 (1979).
343. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 206 n.9.
344. See id. at 41.
345. See Qupty, supra note 25, at 103–04.
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to circumstances in which the state will prevail without a
doubt.346
Individual justices, however, have expressed their own opinions on the subject. Prior to serving on the Court, Meir
Shamgar championed the government’s interpretation of Article
2 as Attorney General of Israel.347 On the other hand, various
justices have indicated their openness to the application of the
Convention, most notably Justice Alfred Witkon. In dicta, he
wrote, “It is a mistake to think that the Geneva Convention
does not apply to Judea and Samaria. It applies even though it
is not justiciable in this court.”348
Although the Court has not made an authoritative decision
on the applicability of the Convention to the territories, it has
explicitly ruled that the Convention is not enforceable in Israel’s domestic courts.349 In Ayyub v. Minister of Defense,350 the
Court distinguished between customary international law and
conventional international law, confirming that the latter is not
enforceable without enabling legislation.351 The Court has offered this ruling as a partial justification for its reluctance to
rule on applicability.352 Unlike the Hague Regulations, the
Court holds the view that the Fourth Geneva Convention, even
if applicable, does not create a cause of action for an individual
in domestic courts.353
While the Court has not considered whether the Fourth Geneva Convention as a whole might constitute customary international law, it has examined this question regarding a particu-

346. See id. at 108.
347. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 54. In an article published after his
election to the Supreme Court, Shamgar stated that there is “no existing rule
of international law according to which the Fourth Convention applies in each
and every armed conflict . . . .” Shamgar, supra note 112, at 262. He went on
to write that application was based on the premise that “there had been a
sovereign who was ousted and that he had been a legitimate sovereign.” Id.
348. Dweikat v. Government of Israel, 34(1) P.D. 1, 29 (1979), summarized
in English in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 345 (1979).
349. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 43.
350. Ayub v. Minister of Defense, 33(2) P.D. 113 (1978), summarized in
English in 9 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 337 (1979).
351. Id.
352. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 43–44.
353. Id.
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lar provision of the Convention.354 In a minority opinion, Justice
Haim Cohn found “the seeds of customary international law”
present in an individual article of the Convention.355
With respect to the objections to housing demolitions made
under the Convention, the Court has primary relied on the local
law doctrine to dodge the issue.356 On the rare occasions that it
has addressed international law, the Court has simply stated
that DER 119, as local law in force prior to 1967, remains in
force.357 It is somewhat ironic, given its ambivalent stand on the
applicability of the Convention, that the Court has even cited
Article 64 of the Convention as support for the rather amorphous local law doctrine.358
c. Analysis
Numerous issues converge when analyzing the application of
the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank and Gaza.
Among these issues are the sovereignty of Egypt and Jordan in
these territories prior to the occupation, the correct reading of
Article 2 of the Convention, the possible categorization of the
Convention as customary international law, and the effects of
Israel’s voluntary acceptance of the Convention. An examination of these issues is necessary for a proper understanding of
the applicability of the Convention.
The question of whether the West Bank and Gaza were the
sovereign territory of Jordan and Egypt, respectively, prior to
1967 has generated a great deal of discussion. The issue is an
interesting one academically, and persuasive arguments can be
made to support both the affirmative and negative conclusion.
According to the Israeli Government, this question is the key to
the application of the Convention under Article 2.359
354. Id. at 43.
355. Qawassmeh v. Minister of Defense, 35(1) P.D. 617, 636 (1980). The
issue was raised regarding Article 49 of the Convention, which concerns deportations and mass transfers.
356. Simon, supra note 46, at 46–48.
357. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 94.
358. See generally Jabar v. Officer Commanding Central Command, 41(2)
P.D. 522 (1987), summarized in English in 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 252 (1988).
This, of course, suggests that despite an unwillingness to authoritatively rule
on the issue, the Court does, in fact, believe the Convention is applicable.
359. See infra text accompanying notes 475–77.
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Professor Blum argued that Jordan never gained sovereignty
over the territory of the West Bank during its occupation between 1948 and 1967.360 This argument is based on the fact that
Jordan and Egypt occupied the West Bank and Gaza, respectively, as a result of aggression.361 Since, sovereignty cannot be
established through aggressive occupation, neither Jordan nor
Egypt could claim sovereign rights.362
Arab governments and certain scholars have denied this theory and argued that sovereignty was, in fact, established.363
However, such arguments are largely unpersuasive. Even proponents of the application of the Convention to the territories
have concluded that sovereignty was never achieved.364 Thus,
this determination appears to be correct.
Emphasis has been placed on the sovereignty question for two
reasons. First, the issue is one of great political significance to
Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Egypt.365 Showing that Jordan
exercised sovereign control over the West Bank strengthens its
claim to the region and legitimizes its position vis-à-vis Israel.366
This posturing, however, has nothing to do with the application
of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Second, the question of sovereignty is at the center of the Israeli interpretation of Article 2, as expressed by Meir Shamgar.
This argument relies on an incorrect reading of the second
paragraph of the article, which states that the “Convention
shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the
territory of a High Contracting Party.” 367 As discussed above,
Shamgar read “the territory of a High Contracting Party” to
mean the sovereign territory of a state.368 As will be demonstrated, sovereignty is not essential to the application of the
Convention through Article 2.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

See infra text accompanying notes 473–74.
See COHEN, supra note 25, at 45–46.
See id.
See id. at 45–47.
See id.; Alain Pellet, The Destruction of Troy Will Not Take Place, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 169,
174–76 (Emma Playfair ed., 1992). For a thorough discussion of the sovereignty issue, see COHEN, supra note 25, at 44–51.
365. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 46–48.
366. Id.
367. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 2.
368. See supra text accompanying note 347.
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According to the first paragraph of Article 2, the Convention
applies “to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.”369 Correctly read, the Convention applies at the outbreak
of hostilities and continues to apply to the territory occupied in
the course of the conflict for an indefinite period of time. The
armed conflict between Israel and Jordan and Egypt in 1967
gave rise to application of the Convention. Once applicable, the
Convention applied to territories occupied by Israel and continues to apply to this day.370
This interpretation becomes clear when the drafting history
of the Convention is examined. The first paragraph of Article 2
was meant to trigger the application of the Convention when
any armed conflict erupted between High Contracting Parties.371
This definition included all stages of the conflict, including belligerent occupation.372
The second paragraph was specifically aimed at situations
where occupation does not result from armed conflict.373 This
provision was a direct result of the Nazi occupation of Denmark
during the Second World War, which did not initially meet with
armed resistance.374 Thus, the second paragraph is wholly ir369. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 2.
370. See COHEN, supra note 25, at 44.
371. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT ON THE
WORK OF THE CONFERENCE OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS FOR THE STUDY OF THE
CONVENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 8 (1947) [hereinafter
REPORT OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS].
372. See id.; REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE OF
NATIONAL RED CROSS SOCIETIES FOR THE STUDY OF THE CONVENTIONS FOR THE
PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 15 (1957).
373. See REPORT OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS, supra note 371, at 8. Proponents
of the government’s interpretation have stated that this reading renders the
word “even” in the second paragraph meaningless, and that this reading is
therefore incorrect, “whatever the meaning intended to be conferred on it by
its draftsmen”; Meir Shamgar, Legal Concepts and Problems of the Israeli
Military Government — The Initial Stage, in 1 MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE
TERRITORIES ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 1967–1980, THE LEGAL ASPECTS 39 (Meir
Shamgar ed., 1982). Professor Kretzmer counters by arguing that even if
application is contingent on the second paragraph, its terms refer to any territory controlled by a High Contracting Party. The requirement that this territory be the sovereign territory of a party has no basis in the Convention or
international law. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 34.
374. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 34.
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relevant to situations where armed conflict has already taken
place.
This interpretation is supported by the official commentary to
the Fourth Geneva Convention, published by the ICRC. It
states:
In case of war being declared or of armed conflict, the Convention enters into force; the fact that the territory of one or other
of the belligerents is later occupied in the course of hostilities
does not in any way affect this; the inhabitants of the occupied
territory simply become protected persons as they fall into the
hands of the Occupying Power.
The sense in which the [second] paragraph . . . should be
understood is thus quite clear. It does not refer to cases in
which territory is occupied during hostilities; in such cases the
Convention will have been in force since the outbreak of hostilities . . . . The paragraph only refers to cases where the occupation has taken place . . . without hostilities, and makes
provision for the entry into force of the Convention in those
particular circumstances.375

The second paragraph was simply intended to “fill the gap” left
by paragraph one regarding occupation meeting no armed resistance.376 This understanding of Article 2 comports with the underlying purposes of the Convention, to “first and foremost protect individuals, and not to serve State interests.”377 This interpretation is consistent with the requirements of the Vienna
Convention.378 A wealth of scholarly material supports this conclusion as well.379
375. PICTET, supra note 312, at 21.
376. Id. at 22.
377. Id. at 21.
378. “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.” See Vienna Convention, supra note 298, art.
31(1). If the meaning is still ambiguous, further recourse is made to supplemental means, including preparatory work. Id. art. 32.
379. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 25, at 51–54; Richard Falk & Burns Weston, The Relevance of International Law to Israeli and Palestinian Rights in
the West Bank and Gaza: In Legal Defense of the Intifada, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J.
129, 138–41 (1991); Christopher Greenwood, The Administration of Occupied
Territory in International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 244 (Emma Playfair ed.,1992);
KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 34, Roberts, supra note 334, at 47; Simon, supra
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As an alternate argument, several academics have focused on
the fact that customary international law is a part of Israeli
domestic law.380 They submit that the Fourth Geneva Convention may represent customary international law.381 This argument is not redundant in light of the above conclusion regarding the interpretation of Article 2. Finding the Convention to be
customary law would not only confirm its applicability, but
would also provide the added benefit of making it enforceable in
Israel’s domestic courts.
The international community has clearly subscribed to the
theory that the Fourth Geneva Convention is applicable to the
West Bank and Gaza. The ICRC, the UN General Assembly,
and the UN Security Council have each stated that the Convention applies to the territories.382 Even the United States has
publicly expressed the view that Israel is required to apply the
Convention.383
Careful legal analysis reveals that Israel’s interpretation of
Article 2 is incorrect. Clearly, the first paragraph of Article 2
compels application, triggered by Israel’s armed conflict with
note 46, at 1199. Even Julius Stone appears to concede that the Convention is
generally applicable to the territories. See Stone, supra note 25, at 95.
380. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 31.
381. See, e.g., Qupty, supra note 25, at 112; Pellet, supra note 364, at 189;
PICTET, supra note 312, at 9; R. Yingling & R. Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT’L L. 393, 411 (1952). Others suggest that at least
some of the articles of the Convention represent customary law. See Theodor
Meron, West Bank and Gaza: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in the
Period of Transition, 9 INT’L Y.B. HUM. RTS. 106, 111–12 (1979). An additional
argument is made under English common law that laws of war (i.e., humanitarian law) is not subject to the conventional/customary law distinction.
Rather, humanitarian law is enforceable in domestic courts regardless of
whether it represents customary international law or not. See Qupty, supra
note 25, at 114 (quoting Benjamin Rubin, The Adoption of International Conventions by Israel in Israeli Courts, 13 MESPATIEM 210, 211 (1983)). Another
alternate argument has been raised based on Israel’s voluntary compliance
with the humanitarian provisions of the Convention. However, Professor
Kretzmer sees this argument as less significant, because it would not necessarily allow for enforcement in domestic courts. See KRETZMER, supra note 6,
at 41–42.
382. See Hussein Hassouna, The Enforcement of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Including Jerusalem, 7 J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 461, 466 (2001).
383. See Carroll, supra note 115, at 1201 (citing 61 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
BULL. 76, 77 (1969)).
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Jordan and Egypt in 1967. Despite issues of domestic enforceability, application of the Convention places significant restrictions on Israel’s continued use of DER 119.
2. Individual Articles Regarding House Demolitions
Having concluded that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies
to the West Bank and Gaza, the protections afforded by individual articles of the Convention become relevant. Clearly,
residents of the West Bank and Gaza are “protected persons”
entitled to full protection of the Fourth Geneva Convention.384
These protections became effective in 1967 and remain in force
today.385
Several articles of the Convention are particularly relevant to
the issue of housing demolitions. This subsection will review
Articles 64, 53, 33, and 71–74 and examine arguments for and
against their application to this issue. Analysis of each will reveal the effects of its application.
a. Article 64: Pre-Occupation Law
As discussed above, Article 64 deals with the preservation of
existing law in an occupied territory. It states, in part, that the
“penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with
the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the
Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its
security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention.”386 Article 64 is significant in analyzing DER 119, as the
regulation falls into the category of existing law.
Of course, the Israeli Government denies the applicability of
the Convention and therefore has no occasion to invoke Article
64 in support.387 Likewise, the Israeli Supreme Court has relied

384. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 4. Possible rare exceptions include, for example, an argument that persons who entered the territory after the occupation did not “find themselves” in the hands of the occupying power as contemplated by Article 4.
385. All of the articles examined in this section remain in force after the
“one year” provision that limits application of specific other articles to one
year in certain occupation situations. Id. art. 6. For a thorough discussion of
this provision, see Roberts, supra note 334, at 36–39.
386. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 64.
387. See infra text accompanying notes 476–477.
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primarily on the “local law doctrine,” although it has cited Article 64 in support of the doctrine.388
Other proponents of the continued use of DER 119, however,
have relied on Article 64 to prevent application of other articles
of the Convention that would prohibit the practice. The argument, as expressed by Professor Julius Stone, is centered on the
concept that Article 64 preempts other provisions.389 The statement that existing penal laws should remain in force thus
“seems even to require continuance of this law.”390 Stone argues
that Israel has no choice but to maintain DER 119 as valid
law.391
Stone also addresses the authorization to repeal the laws contained in Article 64. First, he emphasizes that the language
used is permissive; while an occupying power may repeal laws
contrary to the Convention, but the article “does not oblige him
to do so.”392 Second, Stone points out that the occupying power
may repeal laws that threaten its security and finds that “it
would be very strange indeed to hold that the occupant was forbidden to maintain the existing law when this was necessary
for his security.”393 Finally, he concludes that “the entire practice of demolitions . . . under the unaltered local law in force is
legally justifiable under Article 64 . . . .”394
Stone’s argument is rejected by a number of experts who argue that existing law that runs contrary to provisions of the
Convention cannot be maintained pursuant to Article 64.395
This is plainly stated in the official commentary to the Convention, written years before the occupation.396 According to this
expert interpretation, “when the penal legislation of the occupied territory conflicts with the provisions of this Convention,
the Convention must prevail.”397

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

See supra text accompanying notes 280, 282, & 285–86.
Stone, supra note 25, at 96–97.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 115, at 1206; Simon, supra note 46, at 48.
PICTET, supra note 312, at 336.
Id.
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The official commentary’s position is the correct one. The
purpose of Article 64 is to preserve the laws best suited to the
occupied population and most familiar to them.398 Moreover,
this article protects the population from the imposition of oppressive criminal laws by the occupying power.399 According to
delegates to the Geneva Conference, an occupying power
“should in no circumstances use the criminal law of the Occupied Power as an instrument of oppression.”400 Such an interpretation is in conformity with the object and purpose of the
Convention.401
Perhaps a further argument should be added to those levied
against Stone’s reading of Article 64. A clear distinction exists
between the maintenance of a law and the exercise of government authority pursuant to that law. To the extent that Article
64 can be read as requiring Israel to leave DER 119 in force, it
does not allow Israel to take actions contrary to other substantive provisions of the Convention in order to enforce that law.402
The language of DER 119 is permissive: “A Military Commander may” order forfeiture and demolition of a house; he is
not required to make this order.403 DER 119, thus, creates no
enforcement obligation on the part of Israeli officials. If Stone’s
argument is correct, it simply means that Israel has the option
to leave DER 119 on the books or to repeal it pursuant to Article 64; DER 119 cannot be used as a justification to take action
that conflicts with other articles of the Convention.
b. Article 53: Destruction of Property
The Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the destruction of
property by the occupying power in most circumstances. Article
53 states: “Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or
personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to
398. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY 95
(1957).
399. See id.
400. 2 FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, at
670 (1949).
401. See supra note 378 (explaining interpretation pursuant to the Vienna
Convention).
402. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 64.
403. DER 119, supra note 99.
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social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations.”404 While the prohibition on destruction of property
is clear, the exception has proved difficult.
As Attorney General of Israel, Meir Shamgar argued that
demolitions pursuant to DER 119 are necessary military operations.405 He reasoned that houses from which the attacks take
place are, in effect, military bases and military action is thus
required.406
Shamgar’s argument is strengthened by the fact that Israel
has the prerogative to determine what constitutes military necessity. According to the official commentary, “it will be for the
Occupying Power to judge the importance of such military requirements.”407 Although the exception must be used in a “reasonable manner,” authorities are asked to do so by keeping the
damage proportionate to the advantage gained.408
Great discretion is therefore placed in the hands of the occupying power. Israel is empowered to state that demolitions are
necessary and proportionate. The government argues that the
demolition of “a few dozen homes of proven terrorists” is proportionate to the benefit of the “thousands of innocent lives” that
have been preserved.409
Opponents of the policy claim that this argument is flawed.
They assert that military necessity cannot be claimed days or
weeks after an offense has occurred.410 They also rely on the
ICRC interpretation that the exception is limited to measures
“taken . . . . with a view to fighting.”411 Finally, opponents argue
that the tension between the prohibition and the exception
should be resolved in favor of the former.412
404. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 53.
405. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 147.
406. See Shamgar, supra note 112, at 176.
407. PICTET, supra note 312, at 302.
408. Id.
409. Carroll, supra note 115, at 1208 (quoting ISRAEL MINISTRY OF DEFENSE,
THE ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION IN JUDEA, SAMARIA, AND GAZA — A RECORD OF
PROGRESS 7 (1968)).
410. See Simon, supra note 46, at 69.
411. RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER’S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 155
(1985) (quoting an interpretation by Jacques Moreillon, Director of the ICRC
Department of Principles and Law, dated Nov. 25, 1981).
412. See Simon, supra note 46, at 66.
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The discretion placed in the hands of the occupying power by
Article 53 is problematic. Certainly, many people would agree
that demolitions are not a military necessity. Unfortunately, so
long as the occupying power is authorized to make that determination, the legal argument that demolitions violate Article 53
will be difficult to make. Although Article 53 offers limited restrictions on Israel’s actions, this article is not the strongest
provision from which to challenge demolitions.
c. Article 33: Individual Responsibility
The provision of the Fourth Geneva Convention that most
strongly prohibits the use of housing demolitions as a punitive
measure is Article 33. It states that “[n]o protected person may
be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.”413 This article also prohibits
reprisals.414
In the early stages of the occupation, supporters of DER 119
denied that it imposed non-individual punishment.415 They contended that demolitions were “never carried out as a collective
punishment, but only and solely as a punishment of the individual involved.”416 The assertion was that procedures existed to
determine guilt before demolition.417
Proponents subsequently focused on the involvement of other
occupants. They claimed that demolitions only occurred when
other occupants of the house were implicated in the offense.418
This theory was based on the widely held assumption that it
was “highly unlikely that premises would be in use for terrorist
activities without the owner being in fact implicated.”419
The Israeli Supreme Court has contributed to this discourse
as well. Although not addressing Article 33 in particular, the
413. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 33.
414. Id.
415. Colonel Dov Shefi, The Protection of Human Rights in Areas Administered by Israel — United Nations Findings and Reality, 3 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS.
337, 346 (1973).
416. Id.
417. See Stone, supra note 25, at 96.
418. See Simon, supra note 46, at 58–59.
419. Stone, supra note 25, at 96. This view was also subscribed to by Professor Dershowitz. See Simon, supra note 46, at 58.

File: FARRELL Base MacroFinal.doc

2003]

Created on: 6/14/2003 3:03 PM

Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:23 PM

PALESTINIAN HOUSE DEMOLITION

927

Court has considered challenges to collective punishment under
Israeli administrative law.420 The Court has consistently denied
that DER 119 imposes collective punishment, suggesting that
the effects of demolition on family members are no more serious
than if the head of household, who supports the family, was arrested.421
The Court also reasoned that demolitions pursuant to DER
119 are not punitive.422 Rather, the Court has held that the
purpose of demolitions is deterrence.423 For example, in Nazal v.
Commander of the Judea and Samaria Region,424 the Court
stated that the purpose of applying DER 119 was “to deter potential terrorists from carrying out their murderous acts . . . .”425
Thus, there is no punishment.
Essentially, these arguments can be summarized into three
groups. The first, now essentially abandoned, is that housing
demolitions were only carried out against individual perpetrators of violent crimes and never against other occupants, or that
the effects on others are incidental. The second argument is
that the demolitions punishment is only used when family
members of offenders were aware of, and involved in the offense. Finally, the Israeli Supreme Court asserts that demolitions are not punishment, but are solely a deterrent measure.426
Beginning with the Israeli Supreme Court’s deterrence theory, if demolitions are not punishment, then they truly do not
fall within the purview of Article 33.427 While logically appealing to suggest that the purpose of demolitions is deterrence this
argument is based on the assumption that measures be designed to have either punitive or deterrent effects.428 This incorrect assumption has no foundation in basic theories of criminal
420. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 149.
421. See generally Dagalis et al. v. Military Commander of the Judea and
Samaria Region, 40(2) P.D. 42 (1985), summarized in English in 17 ISR. Y.B.
HUM. RTS. 315 (1987).
422. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 151–52.
423. See id.
424. Nazal v. Commander of the Judea and Samaria region, 42(3) P.D. 641,
(1994), summarized in English in 19 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 376 (1989).
425. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 152 (quoting the Nazaal opinion).
426. Id.
427. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 33 (Article 33 only
prohibits punishment of protected persons).
428. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 152.
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justice. Quite simply, deterrence and punishment are inseparable. One of the primary goals of punishment is to deter
criminal behavior in the future.429 This is achieved through two
means: general deterrence, which is aimed at the population as
a whole; and, individual deterrence, which is intended to prevent the offender from repeating his or her behavior.430 Both of
these methods are achieved by imposing punishment.
Pursuant to DER 119, housing demolitions have all of the
elements required for classification of an act as punishment.431
Demolitions are a form of punishment historically employed by
the British Empire in South Africa and Ireland.432 House demolitions pursuant to DER 119 are clearly punitive and, as a result, are a method of punishment as contemplated by Article 33.
The argument that demolitions were carried out only against
individuals has been abandoned with good reason. While persuasive in the early days of the occupation, this argument is
clearly refuted by the facts. Between May 1985 and early 1987
alone, every demolition carried out by Israeli forces left between
2 and 25 people homeless in addition to the offenders.433
The effects of demolition on families are certainly not incidental to the punishment of the individual. Comparisons of the
effects of demolitions on suspects’ families with those effects
suffered when the families’ breadwinner is imprisoned are
flawed. As Professor David Kretzmer notes, the aim of imprisonment is not frustrated if the prisoner’s family is not adversely
affected, as the main goal is incapacitation and reform of the
prisoner.434 The purpose of demolitions, on the other hand, cannot be accomplished without adversely affecting all other occupants of the house. Imposing suffering and hardship on these
other occupants is a direct, not incidental, part of the punish-

429. See Kent Greenwalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND
JUSTICE 1340 (Sanford Kadish ed., 1983).
430. Id. at 1340–41.
431. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 152. In its early demolition opinions,
the Israeli Supreme Court routinely referred to the measure as punitive. Id.
at 151.
432. See id. at 237 n.56.
433. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 14.
434. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 150–51. See also PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ,
supra note 19, at 14–15.
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ment. The fact that demolitions have been carried out after the
offender has been killed proves this fact.435
The argument that the suffering of family members is an unfortunate side effect is further weakened by the fact that few
demolished homes are owned by offenders.436 Rather, family
members or third parties own the houses. Therefore, others are
not incidentally affected by destruction of the offender’s house.
Realistically the party penalized, most directly is the owner of
the building.
The remaining argument is that demolitions are only used
when the other occupants were aware of or participated in the
offense. This argument is likewise refuted by the facts. There
is no basis in the suggestion that each resident of the demolished houses were somehow implicated in the offense, since Israeli forces routinely carried out demolitions without first contacting other occupants.437 Israeli authorities have not examined the participation of other occupants prior to demolition,
nor does it even accuse them of involvement.438 Even the Israeli
Supreme Court admitted that authorities need not have evidence that other occupants had knowledge of the offense as this
“does not flow from the text of the regulation.”439
Each of these arguments denying that demolitions violate Article 33 fails on its own terms. On the other hand, arguments in
favor of the position are soundly founded and have far reaching
support in the international community and legal circles. These
arguments will now be explored.
The official commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention
clearly describes the nature of Article 33. It begins by stating
that “penal liability is personal in character.”440 This assertion
refers not just to formal punishments under penal law, but also
to “penalties of any kind inflicted on persons or entire groups of
persons, in defiance of the most elementary principles of humanity, for acts that these persons have not committed.”441
435. PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 3.
436. KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 150–51.
437. See Simon, supra note 46, at 59.
438. See id. at 59.
439. See KRETZMER, supra note 6, at 154 (quoting Alzak v. Military Commander of West Bank, 1987(1) Takdin-Elyon 1).
440. PICTET, supra note 312, at 225.
441. Id.
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Additionally, the commentary refers to the companion provision of the Hague Regulations, Article 50.442 It is noted that the
terms of Article 50 might arguably allow for some community
responsibility.443 However, this is clearly not the case with Article 33 where “[r]esponsibility is personal and it will no longer be
possible to inflict penalties on persons who have themselves not
committed the acts complained of.”444
Demolitions pursuant to DER 119 clearly run contrary to the
commentary’s position, which was adopted years before the occupation.445 There is no doubt that the ICRC agrees with this
theory. In 1968, the ICRC reported that it had repeatedly contacted Israel to ask the government “to cease these practices
which are contrary to article[] 33 . . . of the IVth Geneva Convention and to ask for the reconstruction of damaged houses or
for financial compensation to be paid.”446
The position of the commentary is well-founded. Under Article 33, authorities cannot impose penalties on individuals not
responsible for an offense.447 This position comports with the
object and purpose of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Demolitions almost always violate Article 33 of the Convention because they are collective by nature. The outcome would
only be different if the offender was the owner of the house and
was also the only occupant. As soon as another individual is
not wholly culpable for the offense is affected, Article 33 becomes applicable.
Statistical data and individual case studies support the conclusion that Article 33 has been repeatedly violated by Israel.
Data collected by the non-governmental organization al-Haq
reveals that over a ten-year period, only 8.4% of homes demolished pursuant to DER 119 belonged to the offenders.448 Therefore, in well over 93% of cases the brunt of the punishment fell
on the non-offending owner.

442. Id.
443. See Hague Regulations, supra note 39, art. 50.
444. PICTET, supra note 312, at 225.
445. The Commentary was published in 1958.
446. SHEHADEH, supra note 411, at 154 (citing a 1968 report of the International Committee of the Red Cross).
447. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, arts. 71–74.
448. See text accompanying note 159.
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Individual cases reveal similar trends. Houses are demolished without notice and without any inquiry into the involvement or knowledge of other occupants.449 Ownership of the
house is not established by authorities.450 Demolitions are carried out despite the fact that the alleged offender has died.451
All of these cases demonstrate that the Israeli government
practices collective punishment with little regard for other occupants of the houses.
Most convincing is the empirical evidence compiled from findings of fact made by Israeli Supreme Court. Out of 145 houses
demolished, only 7 (4.8% of the total), were confirmed to have
been owned by the offender.452 At least 100 of these houses (69%
of the total) belonged to someone other than the offender.453
Thus in at least 69% of these cases, demolitions have penalized
the owner of the house. In an even higher percentage, other
occupants of the house are also penalized. These demolitions
have been carried out in direct violation of Article 33 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention.
d. Articles 71–74: Fair Trial
Clearly housing demolitions are a form of punishment.454
Demolitions are imposed pursuant to DER 119 when an accused
has illegally discharged a weapon or explosive device or committed an offense against the Defense (Emergency) Regulations
of 1945.455 It follows that DER 119, although termed an administrative procedure, has the characteristics of a penal law.
Thus, the argument can be made that persons subjected to DER
119 should receive the protections afforded to a criminal defendant.
The right to a fair trial is “a fundamental notion of justice as
it is understood in all civilized countries.”456 These protections

449. See SHEHADEH, supra note 282, at 154–56.
450. See Simon, supra note 46, at 59 n.315.
451. See PLAYFAIR, AL-HAQ, supra note 19, at 15.
452. See Figure 2 accompanying note 220.
453. See id. Ownership of thirty-eight houses was not determined. Id.
454. See infra text accompanying notes 429–33.
455. See supra Part III.A.
456. Simon, supra note 46, at 74. See also Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, arts. 71–74.
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are widely considered to be general principles of law,457 and their
application should not be sacrificed to issues of terminology.
Fair trials are governed by Articles 71 through 74 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention.458 Most importantly the first sentence of Article 71 states: “No sentence shall be pronounced by
the competent courts of the Occupying Power except after a
regular trial.”459 This provision contains two important safeguards. First, persons accused of crimes are entitled to a trial.
Second, the trial must be conducted by a court of the occupying
power. According to the commentary, this “safeguard is absolutely general.”460
The basic requirements for fair trials are set forth in Article
72. Among these are the right to counsel, the right to present
evidence and witnesses, and the right to an interpreter.461 Additionally, Article 73 guarantees the right to appeal.462
C. Enforcement
The Fourth Geneva Convention is not enforceable in Israeli
courts, despite its applicability to the West Bank and Gaza.463
Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the Israeli Supreme Court
would accept the view that Articles 71–74 represent general
principles of law.464 Even if these articles were enforceable, the
Court could quite possibly deny that DER 119 is a penal law.465
In any event, the climate in Israel’s domestic system has generally been a conservative one and that the Court would embrace
such a novel concept is unlikely.
However, the establishment of the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”) on July 1, 2002, marks a new era in the enforce457. See MERON, supra note 293, at 49-50; Simon, supra note 43, at 73–74;
Stone, supra note 23, at 96. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights
in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 235 (1993).
458. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, arts. 71–74.
459. Id. art. 71.
460. PICTET, supra note 312, at 354.
461. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art 72.
462. See id. art. 73.
463. See supra Part V.B.1.c.
464. See supra text accompanying note 457 (discussing acceptance of Articles 71–74 as general principles of international law).
465. See supra Part II.C.
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ment of international humanitarian law.466 The ICC does not
provide a forum for individuals to challenge measures that they
believe violate humanitarian law, in the style of Israel’s High
Court of Justice. Rather, the ICC prosecutes persons responsible for violations of the law.467
The jurisdiction of the ICC is narrowly focused on four
crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the
crime of aggression.468 The category entitled war crimes includes grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
Among these breaches are the “extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly,”469 which corresponds to
Article 53,470 and “depriving a . . . protected person of the rights
of a fair and regular trial,”471 which corresponds to Articles 71–
74.472 The list of violations is exclusive; thus non-individual
punishment as prohibited by Article 33 is not included.
As discussed above, violations of Article 53 are somewhat difficult to prove, since the determination of what constitutes military necessity is left to the occupying power. Violations of the
fair trial provision, on the other hand, are much easier to prove
as falling under the ICC statute. The only significant obstacle
is demonstrating that demolitions are form of punishment and
that as such DER 119 is a criminal or quasi-criminal law requiring fair trial protections. Although difficult, this obstacle
can be overcome.
Jurisdiction is the real challenge in using the ICC to prosecute violations of Articles 71–74 in the West Bank and Gaza.
The Court is competent to exercise jurisdiction only “with the
consent of those who will themselves be subject to its jurisdiction.”473 Jurisdiction can be exercised over crimes taking place
466. Ewen MacAskill & Oliver Burkeman, New Court Makes Global Justice
a Reality, GUARDIAN, April 11, 2002, at 17.
467. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
art. 5, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, 137 I.L.M. 999 (entered into force July 1,
2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
468. See id.
469. Id.at art. 8(2)(a)(iv).
470. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 53.
471. Id. at art. 8(2)(a)(vi).
472. Id. at arts. 71–74.
473. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 54 (2001).
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in the territory of a state party to the ICC or crimes committed
by a national of a state party.474
Israel has not ratified the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (“Statute”). Although it signed the Statute on
December 31, 2000, indicating its intention to ratify, Israel followed the example of the United States and, on August 28,
2002, informed the Secretary-General of the UN that it was
“unsigning” the Statute.475 Nor has Egypt ratified the Statute.476
Interestingly, Jordan is a state party to the ICC, having ratified the Rome Statute on April 11, 2002.477 It follows that Jordanian claims to the territory of the West Bank arguably gives
rise to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Jordan’s claim is certainly
tenuous as many scholars contend that Jordan never achieved
sovereignty over the territory between 1948 and 1967.478 Nevertheless, the basis for this territorial claim exists.
An even more intriguing possibility exists. As an accepted
principle of international law, belligerent communities “may
enter into legal relations and conclude agreements valid on the
international plane . . . .”479 The Palestinian Authority certainly
has a unique status in the international community. What
would be the effect of ratification of the Rome Statute by an
elected representative of the Palestinian people?
These two possibilities are, of course, speculative. Legal experts will no doubt express their opinions on the subject, as will
the various parties. Still, this jurisdictional question would not
be decided by the Israeli Supreme Court or left to the halls of
474. See Rome Statute, supra note 467, art. 12(2).
475. The text of the communication read as follows:
[I]n connection with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court adopted on 17 July 1998. . . . Israel does not intend to become a
party to the treaty. Accordingly, Israel has no legal obligations arising from its signature on 31 December 2000. Israel requests that its
intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected in the depositary's status lists relating to this treaty.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court — Participants, Notes, ¶3,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/ bible/englishinternetbible
/PartI/chapter XVIII/treaty10.asp (last visited May 21, 2003).
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 327–35, 360–364.
479. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (4th ed.
1990).
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universities. Instead, this question it would be raised in, argued
before, and ruled on by a new independent international court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Israel has used house demolitions as a punitive measure in
the West Bank and Gaza since 1967. This measure, ostensibly
rooted in the law of the Mandate period, is increasingly used in
response to security concerns in Israel. Clearly, the Israeli
Government views house demolitions as an effective measure.
Demolitions invariably affect all occupants of a house, not
just the alleged offender. Only in rare cases does the house belong to the offender, and in most cases, a number of people
share the subject house. These other occupants are usually not
accused of participation in the offense, and no attempt is made
to determine their culpability before demolition occurs. Furthermore demolitions have occurred in a number of cases after
the death of the offender.
This demolition practice runs contrary to standards of international law. It has been demonstrated that international human rights law is applicable to the West Bank and Gaza.480 Punitive demolitions violate human rights protection against inhuman punishment, a proposition supported by the case law of
the European Court of Human Rights.481
The “local law doctrine” by which Israel has sheltered DER
119 from substantive humanitarian law is unsustainable. The
doctrine is based on a mistaken reliance on the primacy of preexisting law over substantive international law.482 Thus, punitive demolitions must be subjected to the full scrutiny of the
Hague Regulations and Fourth Geneva Convention.
Additionally, the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank and Gaza is undeniable. An analysis of
Article 2 reveals that the Convention is applicable in its entirety to the territories. The oft-used “sovereignty” argument is
irrelevant to application, which properly turns on the fact that
Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in the course of an
armed conflict. The mistaken view that Article 64 obliges Israel

480. See supra Part IV (discussing international human rights law).
481. See, e.g., Selçuk & Asker v. Turkey, 1998-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 477.
482. See supra Part V.B.2.a.
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to enforce DER 119 in violation of substantive international law
has also been dismissed.
Despite the denial that demolitions violate Article 33 of the
Convention, this fact has been well demonstrated. Demolitions
are unmistakably collective and penal by nature. The manner
in which Israel has enforced DER 119 since 1967 clearly establishes its non-individual character. The language of Article 33
and the official commentary on this article confirm the conclusion that Israel’s use of housing demolitions is illegal. Likewise,
the process laid out by DER 119 is offensive to the fair trial
provisions of the Convention. Punitive demolitions are imposed
outside the judicial system without hearing. Procedural safeguards are completely absent.
Israel’s use of demolitions pursuant to DER 119 must end. It
clearly violates provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and
other principles of international law. The Israeli Government,
Israel’s courts, and the international community must all resolve to abolish a practice that has blemished Israel’s standing
among democratic nations.

